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Posts Tagged ‘ZITMO’

Phonarchy in the U.K.

July 15, 2011 1 comment

It looks like that the Perfidious Albion is not what one should exactly define a Paradise for Mobile Security. Not only the echoes of the Scandal concerning “voicemail hacking” led the infamous tabloid News Of the World to close on Sunday, the 10th of July 2011, and Rebekah Brooks to resign as CEO of News International today; but also the flow of events has unexpectedly brought mobile security issues to the attention of a wider audience, no more confined to the sole and exclusive attention of information security professionals.

This is partially due to the relative easiness in implementing similar hacking techniques in mobile communications, which is raising doubts and misgivings in many other countries. As a matter of fact, as actually happened, voicemail hacking is relatively easy to implement and is based, as usual, on two factors:

  • From the user perspective, on the poor attention for default (in)security settings;
  • From the operator perspective, on the necessary trade-off between security, user experience, and convenience, (almost) always favoring the latter, which turns out not to be an optimal choice from a security perspective.

A lethal mix wich may be quite easily exploited by a balanced blend made of (little) hacking and (a lot of) social engineering. At this link a really complete and interesting description very helpful to understand how relatively easy is to perform voicemail hacking with some U.K. operators (but keep in mind that procedures vary from Operator to Operator). Accorrding to the above quoted article, in theory, it is possible to elude the meshes of the security procedures of the operators, simply calling the voicemail of the victim impersonating the legitimate user, claiming to have forgotten the PIN and voila, that’s it!

Voicemail hacking does not need further components, but unfortunately is not the only issue that may happen: in theory entire conversations may be hijacked (and unfortunately it is something we are quite familiar to, here in Italy). The Security Process of a phone conversations is an end-to-end chain, inside which technology is only a component, and the human factor is the weakest link. In this context weak means leak so that often it happens that some information that should not be disclosed are delivered to media (even if irrelevant to any ongoing investigations) with devastating aftermaths for investigations themselves and for victims’ privacy.

The scenario is further complicated with the new generation of smartphones, where technology (and the ongoing process of Consumerization of Information Technology) leaves virtually no limits to the imagination of attackers: not only voicemail hacking, but also mobile malware (a threat which does not need the unintended cooperation of the Operator) capable of extracting any information from devices. The dramatic events in U.K. involved using stolen data for squalid journalistic purposes, but, since mobile devices are nowadays indispensable companions of our everyday lives, nothing prevents, in theory, to use the same or different methods to steal other kinds of information such as confidential data, banking transaction identifiers, etc… Do you really need a confirm? For instance the recent evolution of the Infamous ZiTMo mobile malware that has just landed on Android (the continuing metamorphosis of this malware is really meaningful: born on the Windows platform, it has rapidly spread on Windows CE, Symbian, and now, last but not least, Android). Since it is expected that 5.6% of iPhones/Android handsets is going to be infected in the next 12 months, there is much to worry. In this context what happened in U.K. may constitute a dangerous precedent and a dramatic source of inspiration for organized cybercrime.

Fears that similar occurrences could happen in other countries are rapidly spreading. As a consequence some countries are moving fast to prevent them.

In the U.S., in wake of U.K. Hacking, Representative Mary Bono Mack, a California Republican who chairs the House subcommittee on commerce, manufacturing and trade, is contacting handset manufacturer companies including Apple, Google, Research in Motion, and wireless companies as well, such as AT&T, Verizon Wireless and Sprint Nextel, to determine if there are any vulnerabilities in cell phones or mobile devices which can be exploited by criminals and other unscrupulous individuals. Clearly the final target is to prevent similar events from ever happening in the United States.

For the Chronicle, on June 13 Bono Mack released draft legislation which aims to tighten data security for companies victims of data breaches. Under the proposal, companies that experience a breach that exposes consumer data would have 48 hours to contact law enforcement agencies and begin assessing the potential damage.

Immediately after U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder is considering investigation into News Corp. for the same reson.

Anyway U.S. is not the only country worried about, as similar concerns are raising in Canada, and I may easily imagine that other countries will soon deal the same stuff.

A final curious notice: a further confirm that U.K. is not the paradise for mobile security came this morning when I stumbled upon this wiki which happily shows how to hack a Vodafone femto cell (just released to public) in order to, among the other things, intercept traffic, perform call frauds (place calls or send SMS on on behalf of somebody else SIM card).

The best (or the worst, it depends on the points of view) is yet to come…

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Strong Authentication: Back To The Future

The month of March will go into the annals of Information security. First the breach of RSA, then the issue of fake Comodo Certificates (with the subsequent claim by the Iranian Comodo Hacker) have gradually brought down the (few) certainties the Strong Authentication technologies relied on.

While commenting the beginning of this new era made of very few certainties for our digital identity, I could not help thinking about the (apparently) downward trend to which I was getting used with regards to the strong authentication mechanism adopted for my home banking (be quiet I do not currently have any RSA SecurID tokens, fortunately). Hindsight it could be interpreted as a strange omen (I would suggest RSA to follow the same path).

My first E-Banking contract dates back to 2005, and it was signed with a Regional Italian Bank. In that year, for perfoming operations such as money transfer, I was given a digital certificate stored in a floppy disk (in 2005 sigh!) for electronically signing every transaction. At that time I was firmly convinced that Digital Certificates were the most secure method to strong authenticate transactions, but I never used that certificate since, back in far 2005, a floppy disk was already a thing of the past.

A couple of years later the same bank made a Copernican (r)evolution and decided to dismiss all the certificates in exchange of OTP tokens (not manufactured by RSA but from competitor). Despite some scattered small issues due to a poor IT governance (in a couple of circumstances there was no way to make the PIN to be recognized  and I also was victim of a data loss related to the electronic transactions of the previous four months (of course rigorously without backup, even if the operations had effectively been made), I was quite satisfied with the tokens (but not with the bank). Of course needless to say that these kinds of incidents always happened when I desperately needed to complete the transaction.

Five months ago I changed my bank (looking for better conditions) and decided to open a brand new completely on-line account. Well! Guess what kind of device I was given to authenticate the transactions? After a digital certificate and a token, I would have expected at least a PKCS#11 OTP USB Key… Not at all, I was given instead an efficient (but not very elegant or technological) card with a numerical grid composed by 24 triplets. Nowadays for each operation I am asked to insert three numbers each of them belonging to a different triplet randomically chosen between the 24 printed in one face of the card.

Of course even the most fervid imagination could not imagine that the parable of the strong authentication methods for my bank accounts during these years, could be interpreted as a premonition. Actually banks always know more than the devil, especially when it comes to other people’s money, but I must confess, that, although my initial disappointment for the progressive weakening of the authenticated mechanism necessary to sign transactions, in the last month I changed my mind and now I feel more comfortable with a card having impressed a kind of Caesar Cipher (yes I know that is just not the same thing but the comparison is appealing: back to the future!) than with an OTP Token or a certificate.

I was almost thinking of trying the strong authentication via SMS, but just today I realized that it is not particularly advisable, most of all on the iPhone, where the 2FA (Two Factor Authentication) mechanism has just been compromised. Ok I have an Android terminal but maybe is better not to use any mobile terminals, the threats like Zitmo (Zeus in The Mobile), are always around the corner.

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