From an information security perspective, the second half of June has been characterized by the hacking collective UGNAZI (and its members) and also by an individual hacker: .c0mrade AKA @OfficialComrade.
Both entities have left behind them a long trail of Cyber Attacks against different targets (in several cases the real extent of the attack is uncertain) and with different techniques, although it is likely that the UGNAZI collective will be forced to change the plans after the arrest of the group’s leader, JoshTheGod, nearly at the end of the month (27thof June), effectively they have considerably reduced the rate of their cyber attacks in the second part of the analyzed period.
On the other hand, hospitals, banks, several major airlines are only few examples of the preys fallen under the attacks carried on by .c0mrade. Plese notce that from Cyber Crime perspective, is also interesting to notice the High Roller Operation, a giant fraud against the banking industry, unmasked by McAfee.
Needless to say, the Cyber War front is always hot, most of all in Middle East, were several DDoS attacks targeted some Israeli institutions and, most of all, an alleged unspecified massive Cyber Attack targeted tje Islamic Republic of Iran.
The hacktitic landscape is completely different: maybe hacktivists have chosen to go on vacation since June 2012 has apparently shown a decreasing trend, in sharp contrast with an year ago, when the information security community lived one of its most troubled periods.
If you want to have an idea of how fragile our data are inside the cyberspace, have a look at the timelines of the main Cyber Attacks in 2011 and 2012 (regularly updated), and follow @paulsparrows on Twitter for the latest updates.
Also, feel free to submit remarkable incidents that in your opinion deserve to be included in the timeline.
Few days ago I have discovered that the City I live in (Rome), ranks at number two in the World for the number of BOT infections, at least according to Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Edition XVII.
Of course reports must be taken with caution, but it is undoubted that Bot infections are becoming a huge problem for the Information Security Community (a modern Biblical Plague), so huge to deserve the attentions of The Federal Communication Commission. As a matter of fact, on March 2012, FCC, working with communications companies including Verizon, Cox, and Comcast, has passed a voluntary code that delineates the steps that ISPs must take to combat botnets. As you will probably know, botnets may be used by cybercrookers for making money with different criminal purposes ranging from information theft to the execution of DDoS Attacks: have a look to this interview to a botnet operator to have an idea (and to discover that botnets are used also to counterfeit virtual currency).
Such a similar plague is pushing a major change to the traditional security paradigm, a change that can be summarized in few words: if yesterday the refrain for system administrators was “Beware of what enters your network” (so all the security warfare was focused in checking the ingress traffic), today it is becoming: “Beware of what leaves your network“.
This is nothing else than a consequence of the fact that traditional endpoints technologies are proving not to be so effective against Bots, so a new approach, which aims to control the egress traffic generated by compromised endpoints and leaving the organization, is needed. The effectiveness of traditional endpoint technologies is not optimal since new variants (capable of evading antivirus controls) come out much faster than the related signatures developed by vendors: try to have a look at the average antivirus detection rate against Zeus (the god of bots), and you will probably be disappointed in noticing that it is stable at a poor 38%). On the other hand, recognizing the communication patterns at the perimeter is a more profitable strategy, since the different variants generally do not change deeply the communication protocols with the C&C Server (unless a P2P protocol is used, see below).
The strategy to mitigate botnets relies on the fact that each botnet has (in theory) a single point of failure: it is the C&C Server to which Cyber Hunters and Law Enforcement Agencies address their takeover attempts to take them down definitively or to turn them into sinkholes for studying the exact morphology and extension of the infection). Depending on the botnet configuration, each infected endpoint polls the C&C server for new instructions at a given time interval and that is the point of the process in which good guys may act: detecting (and blocking) that traffic allows to identify infected machines (and my experience indicate that too often those machines are equipped with an updated and blind antivirus).
For the chronicle the C&C Server is only a theoretical single point of failure since C&C Servers are generally highly volatile and dynamic so it is not so easy to intercept and block them (the only way to take down a botnet), hence in my opinion, it should be more correct to say that a botnet has has many single points of failure (an information security oxymoron!).
As if not enough, in order to make life harder for good guys, the next generation botnets are deploying P2P protocols for decentralizing the C&C function and make their takedown even tougher.
But good guys have a further weapon in this cat and mouse game: the cloud intelligence. Even if I am not a cloud enthusiast, I must confess that this technology is proving to be a crucial element to thwart botnets since it allows to collect real time information about new threats and to centralize the “intelligence” needed to dynamically (and quickly) classify them. Real time information is collected directly from the enforcement points placed at the perimeter, which analyze the egress traffic from an organization containing compromised machines. Of course after the successful analysis and classification, the new patterns may be shared among the enforcement points all over the five continents in order to provide real time detection (and hence protection) against new threats. This approach is clearly much more efficient than an endpoint based enforcement (which would need to share the information among a larger amount of devices), provided the enforcement point are positioned adequately, that is they are capable to monitor all the egress traffic.
The combination of the analysis of egress traffic and cloud intelligence is a good starting points for mitigating the botnet effects (for sure it is necessary to identify infected machines) but, as usual, do not forget that the user is the first barrier so a good level of education is a key factor together with consolidated processes and procedures to handle the infections.
One of the most visionary information security predictions for 2012, was the one issued by Fortinet which defined the term Crime As A Service: “Crime as a Service (CaaS), […] is just like Software as a Service (SaaS), but instead of offering legal and helpful services though the Internet, criminal syndicates are offering illegal and detrimental services, such as infecting large quantities of computers, sending spam and even launching direct denial of service (DDoS) attacks“. At first glance I marked this prediction as exaggerated but then I could not imagine that I should have witnessed a huge demonstration only few days after. Of course I am referring to the #OpMegaUpload when, immediately after the FBI takedown, the Anonymous redirected users towards a website when they could DDoS a large group of targets with a simple web click and most of all, without the need to install the Infamous LOIC.
Even if this has been, so far, the most noticeable example, is not the only one of a malicious tool used as a service for criminal (in this case one shot) campaigns. More in general, using very familiar terms (borrowed and adapted from Cloud Terminology) I believe the CaaS is assuming three shapes:
- Software As a (Crime) Service or Saa(C)S, in which the criminals offer malicious software (and the needed support) as a service. An example? The latest Zeus Variant dubbed Citadel, recently spotted by Brian Kerbs, which provides the purchaser with help desk and even a dedicated Social Network;
- Infrastructure As (Crime) Service or Iaa(C)S, in which the criminals offer malicious services (or infrastructures) to attack specified targets, services may include complex “traditional” infrastructures such as botnets, but also “innovative” large scale fashioned services such as DDoS or also sharper services such as password cracking. Try to surf the web and you will discover how easy it is to purchase such a criminal kind of services.
- Platform As a (Crime) Service or Paa(C)S: in which the criminals offer malicious platforms that users may adapt to fit their needs. An example? The brand new HOIC (High Orbit Ion Cannon) the new DDoS tool, evoluti0n of the infamous LOIC, that may be assimilated to a real malicious service platform that users may tailor to fits their needs thanks to the booster scripts. I believe we are not so far from criminal organizations selling customized booster scripts for every kind of need and, why not, offering support services as well.
Last but not least this services are self provisioned, and this is the reason why I used the term “Crime as a Self Service”: in every scenario, be the malicious service a Saa(C)S, Iaa(C)S or Paa(C)S, the user selects directly the target (or the victim), and that’s it!
Una delle previsioni di sicurezza per il 2011 vedeva come protagonista l’aggressiva sopravvivenza delle Botnet (previsione esplicitata da McAfee e Trend Micro). In particolare McAfee si era particolarmente spinto, profetizzando l’unione dei due bot di tipo Trojan “rubatutto” più pericolosi: Zeus e SpyEye.
Per dare una semplice idea, un Bot, abbreviazione di RoBot è un software malevolo un grado di eseguire azioni sulla macchina infetta come un robot informatico (da cui deriva il nome). La questione (poco) divertente dei due citati esempi di Bot consiste nel fatto che non solo sono in grado di rubare informazioni dell’utente dal computer infetto (ad esempio numeri di carte di credito, informazioni del browser, etc.), ma una volta infettata la vittima la trascinano suo malgrado all’interno di una rete di altre malcapitate macchine infette che possono essere loro malgrado utilizzate per compiere azioni illecite (ad esempio l’invio di spam).
Per dare un esempio della gravità del fenomeno, nel poco invidiabile palmares di Zeus rientrano:
- Furto di informazioni nel 2007 presso il dipartimento US dei trasport;
- 74000 account FTP rubati a giugno 2009 presos i server di aziende del Calibro di Bank of America, Monster, NASA, Oracle, Cisco, Amazon;
- Una rete di Botnet composta da circa 3.6 milioni di macchine compromesse nei soli Stati Uniti, resasi protagonista dell’invio di circa 1.5 milioni di messaggi di phishing su Facebook (che rimandano ad un falso sito dove l’ignara vittima scarica il malware e si infetta).
Cosa si può fare per rendere ancora più virulento il malware? Semplice! Unirsi con il malware concorrente più diffuso, SpyEye, e rendere disponibile un kit unico che consenta di crearsi il proprio superbot unione dei due.
Siamo appena entrati nella terza settimana di gennaio e presso il “mercato nero” (con data 11 gennaio 2011) sono già comparsi i primi toolkit del malware combinato:
Il malware è stato messo in circolazione da tale hardesell (evoluzione “furba” dell’harderman autore si SpyEye) ed offre le funzioni di:
- Rilevamento delle password con tecniche di Brute Force
- Notifica Jabber
- Modulo VNC
- Auto Diffusione
- Auto Aggiornamento
- Generatore delle componenti non rilevabile al 100%
- Nuovo Sistema di Screenshot
Tutto questo (sgradito) ben di Dio è disponibile, al mercato nero, alla modica cifra di 300$ senza il modulo VNC e la funzione di iniezione file, mentre la versione completa costa 800 $. Cosa sorpnendente, se si considera che il prezzo previsto per la versione combinata si aggirava attorno ai 4000 $.
[Segnalazione dal Blog McAfee]