Archive
1-16 February 2013 Cyber Attacks Timeline
Here is the summary of the Cyber Attacks Timeline for February. A month that will probably be remembered for the “sophisticated” cyber attacks to the two main social networks: Facebook and Twitter.
But the attacks against the two major social networks were not the only remarkable events of this period. Other governmental and industrial high-profile targets have fallen under the blows of (state-sponsored) cyber criminals: the list of the governmental targets is led by the U.S. Department of Energy and the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Bit9, a primary security firm, was also targeted, leading the chart of Industrial targets.
Hacktivists have raised the bar and breached the Federal Reserve, leaking the details of 4,000 U.S. Banks executives. Similarly, the Bush family was also targeted, suffering the leak of private emails.
Even if the list is not as long as the one of January, it includes other important targets, so, scroll it down to have an idea of how fragile our data are inside the cyberspace. Also have a look at the timelines of the main Cyber Attacks in 2011, 2012, 2013, and the related statistics (regularly updated), and follow @paulsparrows on Twitter for the latest updates.
Also, feel free to submit remarkable incidents that in your opinion deserve to be included in the timelines (and charts). To do so, you can use this form.
The Flame Burning Inside Stuxnet
While the U.S. and Israel keep on mutually claiming the Stuxnet’s paternity, Kaspersky Lab has unveiled further details about Flame that allow to connect it with the infamous malware targeting Iranian Nuclear Plants.
Are the two 21st century Cyber Weapons really correlated? Due to some architectural differences, the first data seemed to exclude any similarities between the two platforms: the so-called Tilded platform which Stuxnet and Duqu are based on, and the brand new platform from which Flame has been developed. In any case never trust appearances, as a small detail dating back to 2012 has unveiled a landscape that seems completely different from what was previously believed, which suggests the hypothesis that the Stuxnet malware had a kind of “proto flame” inside.
The Cyber Spy Story begins in October 2010 when the automated systems by Kaspersky Lab detected a False (Stuxnet) Positive. This sample apparently looked like a new variant (Worm.Win32.Stuxnet.s) but a deeper analysis showed (then) no apparent correlation with Stuxnet so it was subsequently dubbed Tocy.a.
Only two years later, in 2012, after the discovery of Flame, the russian security firm started to compare the brand new malware with previously detected samples to find any similarities. And guess what? The nearly forgotten Tocy.a was nearly identical to Flame. A further check to logs, allowed to discover that the Tocy.a, apparently an early module of Flame, was actually similar to “resource 207” from Stuxnet, and this similarity was the reason why the automatic system had previously classified it as Stuxnet.
Resource 207 is a 520,192 bytes Stuxnet encrypted DLL file that contains another PE file inside (351,768 bytes). It was found in the 2009 version of Stuxnet, despite it was dropped in the 2010 evolution, with its code merged into other modules. The PE file is actually a Flame Plugin, while the purpose of Resource 207 on the 2009 variant of Stuxnet was just to allow the malware propagation to removable USB drives via autorun.inf, as well as to exploit a then-unknown vulnerability (MS09-025) to escalate privileges in the system during the infection from USB drive.
Given the evidences collected, researchers suggests that, although Flame has been discovered a couple of years after Stuxnet, it was already in existence when Stuxnet was created (Jan-Jun 2009), having already a modular structure. The “Resource 207″ module was removed from Stuxnet in 2010 due to the addition of a new method of propagation (vulnerability MS10-046), while the Flame module in Stuxnet exploited a vulnerability which was unknown then, allowing an escalation of privileges, presumably exploiting MS09-025.
Part of the Flame code was used in Stuxnet despite, after 2009, the evolution of the Flame platform continued independently from Stuxnet.
Probably, this is the second important discovery about Flame after the MD5 Collision Attack, which enabled to malware to hide the download of its own modules behind Windows Updates.
Regarding the MD5 Collision Attack, I suggest you to have a look at this very interesting presentation. You will be amazed in discovering that the first successful demonstration of this attack took, in 2008 (the alleged year in which Flame was created), about 2 days on a cluster of 200 PS3s (corresponding to about $20k on Amazon EC2). Together with the complexity of the attack, this aspect is enough to suggest a state-sponsored origin for the malware (i.e. the need of huge resources and know-how). But there’s more: to make the MD5 Collision Attack successful in Flame, the Attackers, had to overcome a huge obstacle corresponding to prediction the Serial Number of the Certificate (which is based on a sequential certificate number and the current time). Nothing strange apparently, except for the fact that they had a 1-millisecond window to get the certificate issued. What does this mean in simple words? A large number of attempts required to get the certificate issued at the right moment, an effort 10-100x more costly that the original MD5 Collision Attack Demonstration.
Now I understand why the Iran Cyber Warfare Budget is estimated to be “only” USD 100 Million…
Related articles
- Back to Stuxnet: the missing link (securelist.com)
- Researchers Connect Flame to U.S.-Israel Stuxnet Attack (wired.com)
- Discovery of new “zero-day” exploit links developers of Stuxnet, Flame (arstechnica.com)
Middle East Cyber War Timeline (Part 5)
Click here for the Middle East Cyber War Master Index with the Complete Timeline.
This week of Cyber War on the Middle East front, has shown a slight change on the Cyber Conflict trend. For the first time since January, psyops have deserved a primary role, maybe on the wake of the video released by the Anonymous against Israel one week ago. Not only the Jerusalem Post calls the video into question, but also argues that it may have been forged by Iran, identifying a state sponsored impersonation behind the entry of Anonymous in this cyber war.
But this has not been the only psyops event as an alleged message from Mossad to the Anonymous has appeared on pastebin, whose beginning sounds like a dark warning: If you want to be a hero start with saving your own lives. Although there are many doubts on its truthfulness, it deserves a particular attention since outlines a new age on psyops, what I call “pastebin psyops”.
But a war is not made only of psyops, so this week has also seen more hostile actions, among which the most remarkable one has been the leak of 300,000 accounts from Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing. This action had been preannounced by a wave of attacks on primary Israeli sites (which targeted also the PM site), and most of all, has been carried on by 0xOmar, the absolute initiator of this cyber conflict.
Palestine has been targeted as well, and it is really interesting to read under this perspective a statement by Ammar al-Ikir, the head of Paltel, the Palestinian telecommunications provider according to whom cyber attacks on Palestinian websites and internet servers have escalated since Palestine joined UNESCO.
On the Iranian front chronicle report of a failed cyber attacks againstPress TV, Iran’s English-language 24-hour news channel and most of all of a controversial statement by Gholam Reza Jalali, a senior Iranian military official in charge of head of the Iranian Cyber Intelligence, according to whom the country’s nuclear facilities have finally been made immune to cyber attacks. And it is not a coincidence that in this week Iran has kicked off the first national conference on Cyber Defense. A matter that deserves a special attention by Tehran because of the growing number of attacks on Iran’s cyber space by US and Israel. On the other hand, Israel did a similar move one month ago, at very early stage of the cyber conflict.
Virus e Servizi Segreti (Ancora Su Stuxnet)

Il complesso di Dimona (Foto Getty Images)
E’ di questa mattina la notizia, secondo il New York Times, che il famigerato malware Stuxnet, il virus delle centrali nucleari, sarebbe stato sviluppato da un team composto da Israeliani e Americani (con la collaborazione indiretta degli ingegneri tedeschi di Siemens) presso il complesso israleliano di Dimona, nel bel mezzo del deserto del Negev.
Lo sviluppo di questo terribile malware sarebbe partito nel 2009. Il virus, assurto alla ribalta nel 2010, ha messo in ginocchio un quinto delle centrali nuclerari iraniane ed avrebbe raggiunto parzialmente il suo scopo (molte centrifughe sono state arrestate prima dell’insorgere di danni irreversibili) secondo il quotidiano d’Oltreoceano, riuscendo però a tardare la realizzazione della bomba sino al 2015.
Stuxnet, che prefigura il modello di infezione informatica Advanced Persistent Threat, che nel 2011 turberà i nostri sogni, aveva da subito attirato l’attenzione dei ricercatori di tutto il mondo sia per la sua complessità tecnica (7 vettori di infezione, l’utilizzo massiccio di vulnerabilità 0-day, la possibilità di falsificare certificati ed infine la conoscenza approfondita della tecnologia Siemens relativa alle centrifughe colpite), sia per i presunti richiami all’Antico Testamento più o meno nascosti all’interno del codice.
La complessità alla base del malware è presumibilmente dovuta al fatto che all’inizio del 2008, Siemens avrebbe collaborato con uno dei principali laboratori statunitensi, in Idaho, al fine di identificare le vulnerabilità dei computer che controllano le macchine industriali vendute da Siemens in tutto il mondo. Macchine Industriali che l’Intelligence d’Oltreoceano aveva identificato essere componenti chiave degli impianti di arricchimento dell’Uranio iraniani.
Siemens sostiene comunque che il programma (confermato dall’Idaho National Laboratory) era parte delle attività di routine volte a rendere sicuri dai Cyber-attacchi i propri sistemi che presiedono alle Infrastrutture Critiche, e ad ogni modo non avrebbe dato all’Idaho National Laboratory, parte del Dipartimento dell’Energia responsabile per gli armamenti nucleari USA, la possibilità di identificare i buchi del sistema utilizzati da Stuxnet nel 2010. I risultati sono stati riassunti in questa presentazione mostrata a luglio 2008 al Siemens Automation Summit presso Chicago. Il laboratorio americano, interrogato sulla questione, si è difeso indicando che la presentazione, sebbene contenesse schemi dettagliati, non mostrava come utilizzare le vulnerabilità, rifiutandosi nel contempo di fornire indicazioni relativamente agli aspetti classificati delle attività effettuate congiuntamente con Siemens. Siemens, dal canto suo, ha commentato la nitizia indicando che la presentazione non recava informazioni relative all’ubicazione delle centrifughe. Sta di fatto che la presentazione è recentamente scomparsa dal proprio sito Web.
L’origine politica del progetto partirebbe dagli ultimi mesi dell’Amministrazione Bush, che a gennaio 2009 avrebbe autorizzato (secondo il NYT) un programma nascosto per sabotare i sistemi elettronici ed informatici del complesso iraniano di Natanz, il principale centro di arricchimento dell’Uranio. Al suo insediamento, il Presidente Obama, appena informato del programma, ne avrebbe accelerato lo sviluppo secondo fonti dell’Amministrazione vicine agli strateghi responsabili dei piani volti a contrastare la strategia nucleare iraniana.
Naturalmente gli israeliani, preoccupati dai pericolosi sviluppi della situazione iraniana, non si lasciarono sfuggire l’occasione sviluppando una strategia di contrasto della minaccia iraniana congiunta con gli USA e differente da quella militare sostenuta sino ad allora.
Stuxnet o non Stuxnet, recentemente sia il Segretario di Stato Americano Hilary Clinton, sia il direttore uscente del Mossad, Meir Dagan, hanno confermato separatamente (rispettivamente il 10 e 7 gennaio) la propria convinzione di un ritardo (o meglio di un arretramento di alcuni anni) nei piani di sviluppo nucleare dell’Iran. Ma mentre la signora Clinton ha fatto riferimento alle sanzioni pilotate dagli USA, sanzioni che avrebbero reso difficile all’Iran procurarsi i componenti, e più in generale commerciare con altri paesi della comunità internazionale; il Signor Dagan ha annunciato al Knesset (il parlamento isreaeliano) l’improvviso insorgere di difficoltà tecnologiche in grado di ritardare la preparazione di una bomba iraniana sino al 2015. Da notare che sino ad allora gli israeliani erano stati fermamente convinti dello stato avanzato di realizzazione del programma nucleare iraniano e che il Mossad è stato accusato dall’Iran di essere la longa manus dietro agli attentati in cui è rimasto ucciso Majid Shahriari, scienziato nucleare iraniano e Fereydoon Abbasi, altro scienzato nucleare, è rimasto ferito.
Gli argomenti della spy story ci sono tutti: CIA, Mossad, lo spettro della Guerra Nucleare, il tutto condito con un pizzico di malware, Cyberwar e… perchè no di Sacre Scritture. Sarà davvero l’ultima puntata della storia?




