It’s time for the Cyber Attacks Timeline for the first half of January 2014. I wish we had a better start for this Infosec year. Not even a month has passed (actually this timeline covers the first two weeks) and we have already seen several massive breaches (Snapchat) and other resounding events, maybe less relevant from a mere numeric perspective, but equally meaningful for the high profile of the victims involved (Microsoft).
Besides Snapchat, other important organizations have been targeted by Cyber crooks with very bad consequences: World Poker Tour (175,333), Staysure (93,000 individuals involved) and OpenSUSE (79,500 victims) are the most noticeable examples. On the cyber crime front other meaningful events include a wave of attacks against Video Games industries, and the hacking of Yahoo advertise network, infecting, potentially 27,000 users per hour.
Hacktivists of the Syrian Electronic Army are back with the result that even Microsoft is now part of the list of their victims (however their web site was also hacked in the same period). Other hacktivists very active in the same period include the infamous RedHack collective.
Last but not least, the control room of the Nuclear Plant of Monju in Japan was found infected with a malware capable of allegedly exfiltrate 42,000 emails.
As usual, if you want to have an idea of how fragile our data are inside the cyberspace, have a look at the timelines of the main Cyber Attacks in 2011, 2012 and now 2013 (regularly updated). You may also want to have a look at the Cyber Attack Statistics, and follow @paulsparrows on Twitter for the latest updates.
Also, feel free to submit remarkable incidents that in your opinion deserve to be included in the timelines (and charts).
The same sophisticated cyber attack that has targeted Facebook and Twitter has also targeted Apple, according to an exclusive revelation by Reuters. In this latest occurrence, the attackers were able to infect several Mac computers belonging to some employees of Cupertino, exploiting the same 0-Day Java vulnerability used to carry on the attacks against the two well known social networks.
Further details have emerged in the meantime: particularly noticeable is the fact that the attackers used the consolidated “watering hole” technique, compromising a well-known mobile developer forum (iphonedevsdk.com) accessed by the employees of Cupertino (and of many other high profile companies). This has raised the concern that maybe the attackers aimed to manipulate the code of smartphone apps to compromise a huge number of users. Currently the forums shows a banner inviting users to change their passwords.
Apple is working closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and has released an update to disable its Java SE 6. Although there is no clear evidence about the Chinese origin of the attack, unfortunately it comes out in the worst possible period: after the wave of attacks against U.S. Media, Mandiant, the firm that investigated the attack against the NYT, released a detailed report suggesting a link between the hacks against U.S. assets. and the Chinese Army.
After nearly a month, the Cyber Attack to Saudi Aramco continues to attract the attentions of Infosec Professionals. If you still have doubts about the fact the human beings are the most dangerous forms of targeted attacks, you should read this article by Reuters: according to internal anonymous sources familiar with the company’s investigation (six firms with expertise in hacking attacks have been hired, bringing in dozens of outside experts to investigate the attack and repair computers), one or more insiders with high-level access are suspected of having assisted the hackers who damaged 30,000 computers at Saudi Arabia’s national oil company last month.
So, apparently, it looks like that Shamoon, in order to unleash its destructive rage, was assisted by an internal mole, “someone who had inside knowledge and inside privileges within the company” according to sources familiar with the company. An event which sounds a little strange, and apparently in contrast with the fact that some coding errors inside the malware seemed a priori to exclude a “state-sponsored” origin for the attack: it is really hard to think about an amateurish operation involving an internal saboteur.
So far, two different groups claimed the responsibility of the cyber attack: The Cutting Sword of Justice and Arab Youth Group, motivating the action with political reasons against what they call Al-Saud corrupt regime (sic). In any case, none of them mentioned an internal assistance for successfully carrying on the attack.
Meanwhile the saga continues, other Oil companies have been hit (Quatari RasGas) by the same malware, and Symantec, few days ago, has reported news of further attacks of W32.Disstrack (Symantec’s Name for the threat vector inside the Shamoon). I wonder if internal moles were involved also in those cases.
Update June 29: 2011 Cyber Attacks (and Cyber Costs) Timeline (Updated)
I found this interesting graph from an original Thomson Reuters post, showing the timeline of the major 2011 CyberAttacks.
The graph shows all the main Cyber Events of this tremendous 2011 up to June, the 16th. Actually to be perfect it should include also the infamous Epsilon Data Breach, happened on March, the 30th. Probably it had a major impact on the U.S. rather than in Europe, but it is clear that the aftermaths of this breach will last for years in terms of spear-phishing attacks tarteting the affected users.
Moreover, to be “ultra perfect”, it shpould also include the other attacks discovered against U.S. Defense Contractors (L-3 on April, the 6th, and Northrop Grumman on May, the 26th) should be considered as well.
Even if some attacks are missing, the graph is useful (and meaningful) to show the easiness with which our data are at risk.
Of course after June, the 16th, another cyber-attack leading to a breach was perpetrated against Sega (to be added to the list of Game Publisher), affecting 1.3 million users.
Following the Sega Breach, in these last two days, after the #Antisec Manifesto and the consequent teaming between LulzSec and Anonymous, several government sites have been hit by massive DDoS attacks, including SOCA in UK, some sites affiliated to PM Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, and some Government Sites in Brazil.
Probably it was a quite easy prediction, however it looks like what I suggested on my random thoughts on the RSA Breach has definitively come true: RSA was not the target, probably its customers were.
On this front, the last two days were quite turbulent, and what seemed initially a simple speculation of an attack using compromised SecureID seeds targeted to “a very large U. S. defense contractor”, is revealing to be one of several attacks towards military contractors of U.S. Defense, using the data stolen during the famous breach of March.
According to a source with direct knowledge of the attacks, quoted in the above linked Reuters article:
The hackers learned how to copy the security keys with data stolen from RSA during a sophisticated attack that EMC disclosed in March, according to the source.
In any case EMC, the parent company of RSA, and the other main U.S. defense contractors possibly involved refused to comment.
I was not surprised by these details, more than one month ago I delineated a possible attack scenario which seems to be very close to what happened, at least for Lockheed Martin. Since the token on its own it is not enough to carry on a successful attack (it must be linked to the owner and very often the real password is also combined with a PIN), other combined actions must be performed to obtain the missing pieces of the puzzle.
I suggested a possible scenario of exploiting the weakness of software tokens, for instance by mean of specific keylogger malware to grab user details and the PIN. It is not exactly what happened in case of Lockheed Martin, but the real attack scenario is quite close since a keylogger was involved as well and used to access the intranet and consequently to get access to the internal network: as a matter of fact, for security reasons many companies use a double layer of authentication for remote access and internal resources. In this case the company forced 100.000 users to reset their passwords.
In reality, as stated by Rick Moy, president of NSS Labs, the initial RSA attack was followed by malware and phishing campaigns seeking specific data that would link tokens to end-users, suggesting that the current attacks may have been carried out by the same hackers. And the game is not over.
Unfortunately the use of phishing to lure the users (and to attack an organization for cybercrime purposes) is not surprising as well. Nowadays this technique, to initially target the users with phishing, leading them to download malware, is the “main engine” of APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) and it is revealing to be the common denominator of the main breaches and huge scale attacks of this annus horribilis for Information Security. The fact that in this circumstance it was used in combination with the duplicated key of SecureID is only the last unedited variant, and I am afraid it will not be the last.
Fortunately, in any serious situation there is always a flash of humor: according to this article of NYT, the intruders had been detected as they were trying to transfer data by security software provided by NetWitness Corporation, a company that provides network monitoring software. Does NetWitness Corporation sound familiar to you? Of course It does indeed! In April, just after the breach, NetWitness was acquired by RSA’s parent company, EMC.
As Morpheus stated: “Fate, it seems, is not without a sense of irony”, and this is worthwhile for Information Security as well.