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Posts Tagged ‘Flame’

Here’s Shamoon!

August 17, 2012 Leave a comment

So, it looks like that the destructive impacts of the cyber attack targeting Aramco, where definitively true. In the same hours in which the first details about the malware were disclosed, Kasperky Lab, McAfee and Symantec have dedicated respectively three blog posts to describe what appears to be the latest example of a large scale cyber attack targeting Middle East (apparently focused on companies belonging to Energy Sector).

Shamoon (or W32/DistTrack), this is the name of the malware, has some points in common (the name of a module) with the infamous Flame, but according to Kaspersky this is the only similarity:

It is more likely that this is a copycat, the work of a script kiddies inspired by the story.

The malware has the same features seen in other “companions” among which the driver signed by a legitimate company “Eidos Corporation”.

According to Symantec, the malware consists of several components:

  • Dropper: the main component and source of the original infection. It drops a number of other modules.
  • Wiper: this module is responsible for the destructive functionality of the threat.
  • Reporter: this module is responsible for reporting infection information back to the attacker.

According to McAfee, machines infected by the malware are made useless as most of the files, the MBR and the partition tables are overwritten with garbage data. The overwritten data is lost and is not recoverable, so this should confirm the destructive details received yesterday.

While, according to Seculert, the malware is a two-stage attack:

Stage 1: The attacker takes control of an internal machine connected directly to the internet, and uses that as a proxy to the external Command & Control server. Through the proxy, the attacker can infect the other internal machines, probably not connected directly to the internet.

Stage 2: Once the intended action on the internal infected machines is complete, the attacker executes the Shamoon malware, wiping all evidence of other malicious software or stolen data from those machines (or also the MBR and the partition table as McAfee Suggested). It then reported back to the external Command & Control Server through the proxy.

So far it is not clear who is behind the attack, although Kaspersky Lab suggests that the term Shamoon:

could be a reference to the Shamoon College of Engineering http://www.sce.ac.il/eng/. Or, it could simply be the name of one of the malware authors. Shamoon is the equivalent of Simon in Arabic.

More details are expected in the next hours.

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Another Massive Cyber Attack in Middle East

August 16, 2012 5 comments

Update August 17: More details about Shamoon, the malware targeting Saudi Aramco and other Middle East companies belonging to Energy Sector. Apparently the destructive details unveiled yesterday are confirmed.

Upate August 27: Saudi Aramco Admits 30K workstations affected.

I have just received a couple of tweets from an unknown user @cyberstrikenews providing more details about the latest Cyber Attack in Middle East targeting Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco).

The Oil Company declared that “production had not been affected” and even if the virus affected some computers, it did not penetrate key components of the network. The company also said it would return to normal operating mode soon.

From the information I have received (I cannot verify the integrity of the source, so I report the data integrally), the situation appears quite different:

  • The company has about 40000 computer clients and about 2000 servers, the destructive virus was known to wipe all information and operation system related files in at least 30000 (75%) of them all data lost permanently.
  • Among the servers which (were) destroyed are the company main web server, mail server (smtp and exchange), and the domain controller which as the central part of their network.
  • All clients are permanently shut down and they will not be able to recover them in a short period.
  • The main company web site ( http://www.aramco.com ) was down during 24 hours and at last they redirected it to an outside country web site called “www.saudiaramco.com”.

Apparently the web site has just been restored to normal operation redirecting the user to Saudi Aramco.

After Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and Gauss, yet another confirm that there is no cyber peace in middle East!

References:

http://pastebin.com/p5C4mCCD

http://pastebin.com/5YB3TUH1

Iran Energy Water Website Defaced By An Israeli Hacker Against The Terrorist Attack in Burgas

You-r!-k@n keeps on his personal battle against Iran.

The latest target is the official website of Iran Energy Water (tw.org.ir), which has been defaced, showing, in several sections, of the main page, a message against the Iran Nuclear Program and against the recent event in Bulgaria where five Israeli tourists (and their local driver) were killed in a terrorist attack in the Black Sea city of Burgas. At the time of writing the web site is unavailable, showing the well-familiar IIS7 Splash Screen (in spite of the embargo and the alleged Iranian Cyber Autarchy).

As you know, Israel blamed Iran for the latter event (backed by American Officials), and hence, easily predictable, the dispute between the two states has (once again) crossed the boundaries of the cyber world (but a defacement is quite a simple question in comparison with Stuxnet and The Flame).

The time of the Middle East Cyber War is well behind, nevertheless cyber events targeting both countries, whether state-sponsored or carried on by lone rangers, continue to happen at a constant rate.

June 2012 Cyber Attacks Timeline (Part II)

July 5, 2012 1 comment

Part I (1-15 June) at this link

From an information security perspective, the second half of June has been characterized by the hacking collective UGNAZI (and its members) and also by an individual hacker: .c0mrade AKA @OfficialComrade.

Both entities have left behind them a long trail of Cyber Attacks against different targets (in several cases the real extent of the attack is uncertain) and with different techniques, although it is likely that the UGNAZI collective will be forced to change the plans after the arrest of the group’s leader, JoshTheGod, nearly at the end of the month (27thof June), effectively they have considerably reduced the rate of their cyber attacks in the second part of the analyzed period.

On the other hand, hospitals, banks, several major airlines are only few examples of the preys fallen under the attacks carried on by .c0mrade. Plese notce that from  Cyber Crime perspective,  is also interesting to notice the High Roller Operation, a giant fraud against the banking industry, unmasked by McAfee.

Needless to say, the Cyber War front is always hot, most of all in Middle East, were several DDoS attacks targeted some Israeli institutions and, most of all, an alleged unspecified massive Cyber Attack targeted tje Islamic Republic of Iran.

The hacktitic landscape is completely different: maybe hacktivists have chosen to go on vacation since June 2012 has apparently shown a decreasing trend, in sharp contrast with an year ago, when the information security community lived one of its most troubled periods.

If you want to have an idea of how fragile our data are inside the cyberspace, have a look at the timelines of the main Cyber Attacks in 2011 and 2012 (regularly updated), and follow @paulsparrows on Twitter for the latest updates.

Also, feel free to submit remarkable incidents that in your opinion deserve to be included in the timeline.

Read more…

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Middle East Cyber War Reloaded

I have just received an email from the israeli hacker dubbed you-ri-k@n providing me with some details about a peculiar Cyber Attack against an Iranian news web site. Looks like you-ri-k@n has a kind of predilection for Iran: you will probably remember him for his last cyber attack (nearly a couple of months ago) targeting the Iranian Meteorological Organization.

This time the victim is the Islamic Republic Of Iran Broadcasting World Service, whose main page currently shows a fake news reporting the death of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sixth and current President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a plane crash.

Click To Enlarge

Clicking on the “News” button redirects the user to an image where (few) additional details about the fake incident are provided:

Few days ago, with the flame still burning, Iranian officials claimed to be under the fire of a massive cyber attack. Of course this isolated episode may not be compared with Stuxnet or The Flame, nevertheless it shows that, even if in a microscopic scale, the cyber tension between the two countries is still high.

The Flame Burning Inside Stuxnet

June 12, 2012 1 comment

While the U.S. and Israel keep on mutually claiming the Stuxnet’s paternity, Kaspersky Lab has unveiled further details about Flame that allow to connect it with the infamous malware targeting Iranian Nuclear Plants.

Are the two 21st century Cyber Weapons really correlated? Due to some architectural differences, the first data seemed to exclude any similarities between the two platforms: the so-called Tilded platform which Stuxnet and Duqu are based on, and the brand new platform from which Flame has been developed. In any case never trust appearances, as a small detail dating back to 2012 has unveiled a landscape that seems completely different from what was previously believed, which suggests the hypothesis that the Stuxnet malware had a kind of “proto flame” inside.

The Cyber Spy Story begins in October 2010 when the automated systems by Kaspersky Lab detected a False (Stuxnet) Positive. This sample apparently looked like a new variant (Worm.Win32.Stuxnet.s) but a deeper analysis showed (then) no apparent correlation with Stuxnet so it was subsequently dubbed Tocy.a.

Only two years later, in 2012, after the discovery of Flame, the russian security firm started to compare the brand new malware with previously detected samples to find any similarities. And guess what? The nearly forgotten Tocy.a was nearly identical to Flame. A further check to logs, allowed to discover that the Tocy.a, apparently an early module of  Flame, was actually similar to “resource 207” from Stuxnet, and this similarity was the reason why the automatic system had previously classified it as Stuxnet.

Resource 207 is a 520,192 bytes Stuxnet encrypted DLL file that contains another PE file inside (351,768 bytes). It was found in the 2009 version of Stuxnet, despite it was dropped in the 2010 evolution, with its code merged into other modules. The PE file is actually a Flame Plugin, while the purpose of Resource 207 on the 2009 variant of Stuxnet was just to allow the malware propagation to removable USB drives via autorun.inf, as well as to exploit a then-unknown vulnerability (MS09-025) to escalate privileges in the system during the infection from USB drive.

Given the evidences collected, researchers suggests that, although Flame has been discovered a couple of years after Stuxnet, it was already in existence when Stuxnet was created (Jan-Jun 2009), having already a modular structure. The “Resource 207″ module was removed from Stuxnet in 2010 due to the addition of a new method of propagation (vulnerability MS10-046), while the Flame module in Stuxnet exploited a vulnerability which was unknown then, allowing an escalation of privileges, presumably exploiting MS09-025.

Part of the Flame code was used in Stuxnet despite, after 2009, the evolution of the Flame platform continued independently from Stuxnet.

Probably, this is the second important discovery about Flame after the MD5 Collision Attack, which enabled to malware to hide the download of its own modules behind Windows Updates.

Regarding the MD5 Collision Attack, I suggest you to have a look at this very interesting presentation. You will be amazed in discovering that the first successful demonstration of this attack took, in 2008 (the alleged year in which Flame was created), about 2 days on a cluster of 200 PS3s (corresponding to about $20k on Amazon EC2). Together with the complexity of the attack, this aspect is enough to suggest a state-sponsored origin for the malware (i.e. the need of huge resources and know-how). But there’s more: to make the MD5 Collision Attack successful in Flame, the Attackers, had to overcome a huge obstacle corresponding to prediction the Serial Number of the Certificate (which is based on a sequential certificate number and the current time). Nothing strange apparently, except for the fact that they had a 1-millisecond window to get the certificate issued. What does this mean in simple words? A large number of attempts required to get the certificate issued at the right moment, an effort 10-100x more costly that the original MD5 Collision Attack Demonstration.

Now I understand why the Iran Cyber Warfare Budget is estimated to be “only” USD 100 Million

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