Archive
One Year Of Android Malware (Full List)
Update August 14: After the list (and the subsequent turmoil) here is the Look Inside a Year Of Android Malware.
So here it is the full list of Android Malware in a very dangerous year, since August, the 9th 2011 up-to-today.
My birthday gift for the Android is complete: exactly One year ago (9 August 2010) Kaspersky discovered the first SMS Trojan for Android in the Wild dubbed SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a. This is considered a special date for the Google Mobile OS, since, before then, Android Malware was a litte bit more than en exercise of Style, essentially focused on Spyware. After that everything changed, and mobile malware targeting the Android OS become more and more sophisticated.
Scroll down my special compilation showing the long malware trail which characterized this hard days for information security. Commenting the graph, in my opinion, probably the turning point was Android.Geinimi (end of 2010), featuring the characteristics of a primordial Botnet, but also Android.DroidDream (AKA RootCager) is worthwhile to mention because of its capability to root the phone and potentially to remotely install applications without direct user intervention.
As you will notice, the average impact is low, but, the number of malware is growing exponentially reaching a huge peak in July.
Let’s go in this mobile malware travel between botnets, sleepwalkers, biblic plagues and call Hijackers, and meanwhile do not forget to read my presentation on how to implement a secure mobile strategy.
| Date | Description | Features | Overall Risk |
| Aug 9 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a
First SMS Android Malware In the Wild: The malicious program penetrates Android devices in the guise of a harmless media player application. Once manually installed on the phone, the Trojan uses the system to begin sending SMSs to premium rate numbers without the owner’s knowledge or consent, resulting in money passing from a user’s account to that of the cybercriminals. |
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| Aug 17 2010 | AndroidOS_Droisnake.A
This is the first GPS Spy Malware disguised as an Android Snake game application. To the victim, Tap Snake looks like a clone of the Snake game. However, once someone installs this app on a phone, the “game” serves as a front for a spy app that proceeds to run in the background, secretly reporting GPS coordinates back to a server. The would-be spy then pays for and downloads an app called GPS Spy and enters an email address and code to gain access to the victim’s uploaded data. |
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| Sep 14 2010 | SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.b
Pornography lands on Android! This malware is a variant of SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. The malware poses as a pornographic application whose package name is pornoplayer.apk, and it installs on the phone with a pornographic icon. When the user launches the application, the malware does not show any adult content and, instead, sends 4 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Oct 13 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.c
Pornography back on Android! Third variant of the malware SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. New pornographic application, old icon. Sends 2 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Dec 29 2010 |
Android.Geinimi
First example of a Botnet-Like Malware on Android. “Grafted” onto repackaged versions of legitimate applications, primarily games, and distributed in third-party Chinese Android app markets. Once the malware is installed on a user’s phone, it has the potential to receive commands from a remote server that allow the owner of that server to control the phone. The specific information it collects includes location coordinates and unique identifiers for the device (IMEI) and SIM card (IMSI). |
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| Feb 14 2011 |
Android.Adrd AKA Android.HongTouTou
New Malware with Botnet-like Features from China. The trojan compromises personal data such as IMEI/IMSI of the device and sends them back to the remote side to react based on the commands from there. Similar to Android.Geinimi but with a lower profile (less commands) |
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| Feb 22 2011 | Android.Pjapps
New Trojan horse embedded on third party applications. It opens a back door on the compromised device and retrieves commands from a remote command and control server. |
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| Mar 1 2011 | Android.DroidDream AKA Android.Rootcager AKA AndroidOS_Lootoor.A The first example of a new generation of Mobile Malware: distributed through the Official Android Market, affected, according to Symantec 50,000 to 200,000 users. Expoits two different tools (rageagainstthecage and exploid) to root the phone |
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| Mar 9 2011 | Android.BgServ AKA Troj/Bgserv-A AKA AndroidOS_BGSERV.A Trojanized version of the Android Market Security tool released by Google, on March the 6th, to remove the effects of DroidDream. The trojan opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location. It shows more than ever security and reputation flaws in the Android Market Proposition Model. 5,000 users affected. |
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| Mar 20 2011 | Android.Zeahache Trojan horse that elevates privileges on the compromised device, discovered on a Chinese language app available for download on alternative Chinese app markets. The app has the ability to root an Android device (by mean of the exploid tool called by zHash binary), leaving the device vulnerable to future threats. The app, which provides calling plan management capabilities was found also on the Android Market albeit this version lacked the code to invoke the exploit. |
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| Mar 30 2011 | Android.Walkinwat
Manually installed from non-official Android Markets, the Trojan modifies certain permissions on the compromised device that allow it to perform the following actions: Access contacts in the address book, ccess network information, access the phone in a read-only state, access the vibrator on the phone, Check the license server for the application, find the phone’s location, initiate a phone call without using the interface, open network sockets to access the Internet, read low-level log files, send SMS messages, turn the phone on and off. It gives a message to user trying to discipline users that download files illegally from unauthorized sites. |
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| May 9 2011 |
Android.Adsms AKA AndroidOS_Adsms.A This malware specifically targeted China Mobile subscribers. The malware arrived through a link sent through SMS. The said message tells the China Mobile users to install a patch for their supposedly vulnerable devices by accessing the given link, which actually leads to a malicious configuration file. The malware then send message to premium numbers. |
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| May 11 2011 |
Android.Zsone AKA Android.Smstibook Google removed a Trojan, Zsone, from the Android Market with the ability to subscribe users in China to premium rate QQ codes via SMS without their knowledge. 10,000 users affected. |
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| May 22 2011 |
A biblical plague For Android! Trojanized version of a legitimate application that is part threat, part doomsayer. The threat was embedded in a pirated version of an app called ‘Holy ***king Bible’, which itself has stirred controversy on multiple forums in which the app is in circulation. The malware targeted North American Users. After the reboot, it starts a service whichm at regular intervals, attempts to contact a host service, passing along the device’s phone number and operator code. It then attempts to retrieve a command from a remote location in intervals of 33 minutes. In addition to having abilities to respond to commands through the Internet and SMS, the threat also has activities that are designed to trigger on the 21 and 22 of May 2011, respectively (The End of The World). |
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| May 31 2011 |
A brand new version of Android.DroidDream, dubbed DroidDreamLight, was found in 24 additional apps repackaged and redistributed with the malicious payload across a total of 5 different developers distributed in the Android Market. Between 30.000 and 120.000 users affected. |
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| Jun 6 2011 |
Android/DroidKungFu.A AKA Android.Gunfu Malware which uses the same exploit than DroidDream, rageagainstthecage, to gain root privilege and install the main malware component. Once installed, the malware has backdoor capabilities and is able to: execute command to delete a supplied file, execute a command to open a supplied homepage, download and install a supplied APK, open a supplied URL, run or start a supplied application package. The malware is moreover capable to obtain some information concerning the device and send them to a remote server: The collected information include: IMEI number, Build version release, SDK version, users’ mobile number, Phone model, Network Operator, Type of Net Connectivity, SD card available memory, Phone available memory. In few words, the device is turned into a member of a botnet. |
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| Jun 9 2011 |
Trojan Horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. When an infected application is installed, it attempts to exploit the udev Netlink Message Validation Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (BID 34536) in order to obtain “root” privileges. Once running with “root” privileges it installs an executable which contains functionality to communicate with a control server using HTTP protocol and sends information such as Subscriber ID, Manufacturer and Model of the device, Version of the Android operating system. The Trojan also periodically connects to the control server and may perform the following actions: send SMS messages, remove SMS messages from the Inbox and dial phone numbers. The Trojan also contains functionality to monitor phone usage. |
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| Jun 9 2011 |
Android.Uxipp AKA Android/YZHCSMS.A Trojan Horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. Again the threat is as an application for a Chinese gaming community. When executed, the Trojan attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to several numbers and remove the SMS sent. |
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| Jun 10 2011 |
Andr/Plankton-A AKA Android.Tonclank This is a Trojan horse which steals information and may open a back door on Android devices. Available for download in the Android Market embedded in several applications, when the Trojan is executed, it steals the following information from the device: Device ID and Device permissions. The above information is then sent to a remote server from which the Trojan downloads a .jar file which opens a back door and accepts commands to perform the following actions on the compromised device: copies all of the bookmarks on the device, copies all of the history on the device, copies all of the shortcuts on the device, creates a log of all of the activities performed on the device, modifies the browser’s home page, returns the status of the last executed command. The gathered information is then sent to a remote location. |
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| Jun 15 2011 |
Trojan found in alternative Android markets that predominately target Chinese Android users. This Trojan predominantly affects devices with a custom ROM. The application masquerades as a legitimate one and exploits a vulnerability found in the way most custom ROMs sign their system images to install a secondary payload (without user permission) onto the ROM, giving it the ability to communicate with a remote server and receive commands. Once installed the second payload may read, send and process incoming SMS messages (potentially for mTAN interception or fraudulent premium billing subscriptions), install apps trasparently, communicate with a remote server using DES encryption. |
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| Jun 20 2011 |
This trojan is automatically downloaded to a user’s phone after visiting a malicious webpage that imitates the Android Market. The Trojan, which targets users in the United States by interacting with a number of premium SMS subscription services without consent, is able to sign-up a victim to a number of premium SMS subscription services without the user’s consent. This can lead to unapproved charges to a victim’s phone bill. Android users are directed to install this Trojan after clicking on a malicious in-app advertisement, for instance a Fake Battery Saver. |
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| Jul 1 2011 |
Repackaged and distributed in the form of “legitimate” applications, these two variants are different from the original one by re-implementing some of their malicious functionalities in native code and supporting two additional command and control (C&C) domains. The changes are possibly in place to make their detection and analysis harder. The repackaged apps infected with the DroidKungFu variants are made available through a number of alternative app markets and forums targeting Chinese-speaking users. |
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| Jul 3 2011 | AndroidOS_Crusewin.A AKA Android.Crusewind
Another example of a trojan which sends SMS to premium rate numbers. It also acts as a SMS Relay. It displays a standard Flash icon in the application list. The Trojan attempts to download an XML configuration file and uses it to retrieve a list of further URLs to send and receive additional data. The Trojan also contains functionality to perform the following actions: delete itself, delete SMS messages, send premium-rate SMS messages to the number that is specified in the downloaded XML configuration file, update itself. |
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| Jul 6 2011 |
AndroidOS_SpyGold.A AKA Android.GoldDream This backdoor is a Trojanized copy of a legitimate gaming application for Android OS smartphones. It steals sensitive information of the affected phone’s SMS and calls functions, compromising the security of the device and of the user. It monitors the affected phone’s SMS and phone calls and sends stolen information to a remote URL. It also connects to a malicious URL in order to receive commands from a remote malicious user. |
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| Jul 8 2011 | DroidDream Light Variant New variant of DroidDream Light in the Android Market, immediately removed by Google. Number of downloads was limited to 1000 – 5000. This is the third iteration of malware likely created by the authors of DroidDream. |
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| Jul 11 2011 |
Android.Smssniffer AKA Andr/SMSRep-B/C AKA Android.Trojan.SmsSpy.B/C AKA Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Smser.a
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| Jul 12 2011 |
Android.HippoSMS AKA Android.Hippo Another threat found bundled with repackaged versions of legitimate applications. When the Trojan is executed, it grabs a copy of all SMS messages received on the handheld device and sends them to a remote location. |
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| Jul 15 2011 |
This threat is often found bundled with repackaged versions of legitimate applications. The repackaged applications are typically found on unofficial websites offering Android applications. When the Trojan is executed, it steals information and sends it to a remote server. |
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| Jul 15 2011 |
Android/Sndapps.A AKA Android.Snadapps Five Android Apps found in the official Android Market share a common suspicious payload which upload users’ personal information such as email accounts as well as phone numbers to a remote server without user’s awareness. |
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| Jul 27 2011 |
Trojan horse which steals several information from Android devices (for instance GPS Location or Wi-Fi position). For the first time on the Android Platform a malware is believed to spy conversations. |
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| Jul 28 2011 |
Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone number. When the Trojan is executed, it retrieves information containing premium-rate phone numbers from a malicious URL then sends premium-rate SMS messages. and attempts to block any confirmation SMS messages the compromised device may receive from the premium-rate number in an attempt to mask its activities. The Trojan also attempts to gather IMSI and location information and send the information to the remote attacker. |
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| Aug2 2011 |
This is a detection for Trojan horses that send SMS texts to premium-rate numbers. These Trojan is a repackaged versions of genuine Android software packages, often distributed outside the Android Marketplace. The package name, publisher, and other details will vary and may be taken directly from the original application.. |
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| Aug 9 2011 |
It belongs to the same NickiSpy family. However, it is significantly different from its predecessor since it is fully controlled by SMS messages instead of relying on a hard-coded C&C server for instructions. In addition, NickiBot supports a range of bot commands, such as for (GPS-based) location monitoring, sound recording and (email-based) uploading, calllog collection, etc. It also has a check-in mechanism to a remote website. his threat is often found bundled with repackaged versions of legitimate applications. The repackaged applications are typically found on unofficial websites offering Android applications. When the Trojan is executed, it steals information and sends it to a remote server. |
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Legend
Parallel Market
Android Market
Manual Install
Automatic Install of Apps
Send SMS or Calls to Premium Numbers
Server C&C
GPS Spyware
Root Access
Related articles
- Happy Birthday! One Year of Android Malware (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
- Nine Months Of Living Dangerously (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
Happy Birthday! One Year of Android Malware
Exactly One year ago (9 August 2010) Kaspersky discovered the first SMS Trojan for Android in the Wild dubbed SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a. This is considered a special date for the Google Mobile OS, since, before then, Android Malware was a litte bit more than en exercise of Style, essentially focused on Spyware. After that everything changed, and mobile malware targeting the Android OS become more and more sophisticated.
For this reason I decided to prepare a special birthday gift for the Android, that is a special compilation showing the long malware trail which characterized this day. Commenting the graph, in my opinion, probably the turning point was Android.Geinimi (end of 2010), featuring the characteristics of a primordial Botnet, but also Android.DroidDream (AKA RootCager) is worthwhile to mention because of its capability to root the phone and potentially to remotely install applications without direct user intervention. Moreover, as you will have probably noticed, the average impact is low, but, the number of malware is growing exponentially after June, this is the reason why I decided to divide my special compilation in two parts. Today is part I: from the beginning to May, the 31st 2011.
Let’s go in this mobile malware travel between botnets, sleepwalkers and biblic plagues and meanwhile do not forget to read my presentation on how to implement a secure mobile strategy.
| Date | Description | Features | Overall Risk |
| Aug 9 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a
First SMS Android Malware In the Wild: The malicious program penetrates Android devices in the guise of a harmless media player application. Once manually installed on the phone, the Trojan uses the system to begin sending SMSs to premium rate numbers without the owner’s knowledge or consent, resulting in money passing from a user’s account to that of the cybercriminals. |
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| Aug 17 2010 | AndroidOS_Droisnake.A
This is the first GPS Spy Malware disguised as an Android Snake game application. To the victim, Tap Snake looks like a clone of the Snake game. However, once someone installs this app on a phone, the “game” serves as a front for a spy app that proceeds to run in the background, secretly reporting GPS coordinates back to a server. The would-be spy then pays for and downloads an app called GPS Spy and enters an email address and code to gain access to the victim’s uploaded data. |
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| Sep 14 2010 | SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.b
Pornography lands on Android! This malware is a variant of SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. The malware poses as a pornographic application whose package name is pornoplayer.apk, and it installs on the phone with a pornographic icon. When the user launches the application, the malware does not show any adult content and, instead, sends 4 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Oct 13 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.c
Pornography back on Android! Third variant of the malware SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. New pornographic application, old icon. Sends 2 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Dec 29 2010 |
Android.Geinimi
First example of a Botnet-Like Malware on Android. “Grafted” onto repackaged versions of legitimate applications, primarily games, and distributed in third-party Chinese Android app markets. Once the malware is installed on a user’s phone, it has the potential to receive commands from a remote server that allow the owner of that server to control the phone. The specific information it collects includes location coordinates and unique identifiers for the device (IMEI) and SIM card (IMSI). |
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| Feb 14 2011 |
Android.Adrd AKA Android.HongTouTou
New Malware with Botnet-like Features from China. The trojan compromises personal data such as IMEI/IMSI of the device and sends them back to the remote side to react based on the commands from there. Similar to Android.Geinimi but with a lower profile (less commands) |
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| Feb 22 2011 | Android.Pjapps
New Trojan horse embedded on third party applications. It opens a back door on the compromised device and retrieves commands from a remote command and control server. |
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| Mar 1 2011 | Android.DroidDream AKA Android.Rootcager AKA AndroidOS_Lootoor.A The first example of a new generation of Mobile Malware: distributed through the Official Android Market, affected, according to Symantec 50,000 to 200,000 users. Expoits two different tools (rageagainstthecage and exploid) to root the phone |
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| Mar 9 2011 | Android.BgServ AKA Troj/Bgserv-A AKA AndroidOS_BGSERV.A Trojanized version of the Android Market Security tool released by Google, on March the 6th, to remove the effects of DroidDream. The trojan opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location. It shows more than ever security and reputation flaws in the Android Market Proposition Model. 5,000 users affected. |
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| Mar 20 2011 | Android.Zeahache Trojan horse that elevates privileges on the compromised device, discovered on a Chinese language app available for download on alternative Chinese app markets. The app has the ability to root an Android device (by mean of the exploid tool called by zHash binary), leaving the device vulnerable to future threats. The app, which provides calling plan management capabilities was found also on the Android Market albeit this version lacked the code to invoke the exploit. |
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| Mar 30 2011 | Android.Walkinwat
Manually installed from non-official Android Markets, the Trojan modifies certain permissions on the compromised device that allow it to perform the following actions: Access contacts in the address book, ccess network information, access the phone in a read-only state, access the vibrator on the phone, Check the license server for the application, find the phone’s location, initiate a phone call without using the interface, open network sockets to access the Internet, read low-level log files, send SMS messages, turn the phone on and off. It gives a message to user trying to discipline users that download files illegally from unauthorized sites. |
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| May 9 2011 |
Android.Adsms AKA AndroidOS_Adsms.A This malware specifically targeted China Mobile subscribers. The malware arrived through a link sent through SMS. The said message tells the China Mobile users to install a patch for their supposedly vulnerable devices by accessing the given link, which actually leads to a malicious configuration file. The malware then send message to premium numbers. |
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| May 11 2011 |
Android.Zsone AKA Android.Smstibook Google removed a Trojan, Zsone, from the Android Market with the ability to subscribe users in China to premium rate QQ codes via SMS without their knowledge. 10,000 users affected. |
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| May 22 2011 |
A biblical plague For Android! Trojanized version of a legitimate application that is part threat, part doomsayer. The threat was embedded in a pirated version of an app called ‘Holy ***king Bible’, which itself has stirred controversy on multiple forums in which the app is in circulation. The malware targeted North American Users. After the reboot, it starts a service whichm at regular intervals, attempts to contact a host service, passing along the device’s phone number and operator code. It then attempts to retrieve a command from a remote location in intervals of 33 minutes. In addition to having abilities to respond to commands through the Internet and SMS, the threat also has activities that are designed to trigger on the 21 and 22 of May 2011, respectively (The End of The World). |
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| May 31 2011 |
A brand new version of Android.DroidDream, dubbed DroidDreamLight, was found in 24 additional apps repackaged and redistributed with the malicious payload across a total of 5 different developers distributed in the Android Market. Between 30.000 and 120.000 users affected. |
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Legend
Parallel Market
Android Market
Manual Install
Automatic Install of Apps
Send SMS or Calls to Premium Numbers
Server C&C
GPS Spyware
Related articles
- Nine Months Of Living Dangerously (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
Nine Months Of Living Dangerously
The title of this post is not a subset of the famous Peter Weir’s Movie “The Year Of Living Dangerously“, featuring Mel Gibson and Sigourney Weaver, but rather refers to the dangerous months which the Android is living, from the second half of 2010 to this first half of 2011, which saw a dramatic increase in Android Malware.
I enjoyed in summarizing in a single picture the mobile malware which affected Google Mobile OS from August 2010 to the present day. As shown the results are not encouraging and seems to confirm, in a qualitative form, the 400% increase in mobile malware (in six months) recently stated by Juniper Networks: un the second half of 2011 we assisted mainly to variants of the first Trojan. In the first half of 2011 the landscape has become much more complicated with mobile malware tailored “for different needs”.
So far the threats are can be divided essentially into two categories:
- Malware capable of stealing data, sending them to a remote C&C, which in a mobile platform may have worst consequences since it may send remote data to a C&C Server);
- Malware capable of sending SMS to premium rate numbers without the user permission (and awareness).
In many cases the malware was downloaded by parallel markets (most of all from China and Russia), with often the pornography acting like a decoy for the unfortunates, hence showing the risks connected with sideloading, that is the practice to enable installation of applications downloaded from external markets.
Two examples were particularly meaningful: the example of Geinimi, which showed all the features of a Botnet. And the example of DroidDream which bypassed all the security control of Android Market and infected something between 50.000 and 200.000 users according to Symantec and were remotely removed by Google, thus prefiguring a new security model which remotely manages the security functions of endpoint (and everything suggests that this trend will soon spread to more traditional endpoints: just today I stumbled upon this really interesting article).
By the way… Just today, three German security researchers discovered a serious flaw on the ClientLogin Authentication Protocol affecting almost all the Android powered devices… Ok it is not a malware, but the security concerns for the Google Mobile Operating System are more relevant than ever…
Related articles
- 400 Percent Increase In Android Malware; Mobile Security Threats At Record High (techcrunch.com)
- If The Droid Gets The (China’s) Flu (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
- Chronicles Of The Android (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
Chronicles Of The Android
The title of this post recalls a science fiction novel, but actually summarizes well a couple of news concerning the Android, which bounced in these days. Even if they seem apparently disjoined I decided to insert them in the same post: there is a logical link which connects the commercial success of a platform and the attention it attracts by malicious, and this seems to be the destiny of Android, to which the market share reserves a bright future, which become much less bright if one considers the information security consequences.
Part 1: Smartphone Market Share
This seems to be the right time for predictions as far as the smartphone market is concerned, that is the reason why I really was enjoyed in comparing the projections of ABI Research (released today), with the ones released from IDC a couple of days ago. The results are summarized in the following tables. Even if they are targeted at different years in the near future (respectively 2016 for ABI Research and 2015 for IDC), comparing the two reports is interesting for imaging what the future of the smartphone Operating System will be.
| ABI Research | IDC | |||||
| Operating System | 2010 | 2016 | Operating System | 2011 | 2015 | |
| Android | 23,00% | 45,00% | Android | 39,50% | 45,40% | |
| RIM | 16,00% | 14,00% | RIM | 14,90% | 13,70% | |
| iOS | 15,00% | 19,00% | iOS | 15,70% | 15,30% | |
| Symbian | 36,00% | - | Symbian | 20,90% | 0,20% | |
| Windows Phone 7/Windows Mobile | 0,60% | 7,50% | Windows Phone 7/Windows Mobile | 5,50% | 20,90% | |
| Others | 9,40% | 14,50% | Others | 3,50% | 4,60% | |
Often the providers of market intelligence do not agree on anything, but in this case, if there is one thing that seems to have no doubt, is the scepter of the Android, which seems to be destined, for both reports, to rule the market with nearly one half of the total smartphones shipped after 2015. The data also confirm a stable position for RIM (around 13%-14%), while do not completely agree as far as Apple is concerned, for which ABI research estimates a market share of 19% in 2016 and IDC a market share of 15% in 2015. But were the data are surprisingly different, is on the Windows Phone Market Share. According to ABI Research, Windows Phone will reach the 7% of the market (which become 7.5 adding the market share of its predecessor Windows Mobile). Unfortunately I do not think that, according to Microsoft’s hopes, the number 7 which identifies the mobile operating system series, pertains to the market share in 2016. Last and (unfortunately) least? IDC is more optimistic and foresees a bright future for Redmond in the mobile arena, with its creature ranking immediately behind the Android with the 20% of the market. Will be very amusing to see (in 5 years if we will remember) who was right.
Last and (unfortunately) least, the poor Symbian, sacrificial victim of Nokia and Microsoft agreement, which, in 5 years will remain little more than a romantic remembrance for mobile lovers, while, surprisingly, ABI research foresees a surprising 10% market share for Samsung Bada in 2016.
Part 2: Mobile Malware Market Share
Of course I am an infosec guy so I wonder if also the mobile malware will follow the same trend. This consideration arises from an interesting article I found in the Fortinet blog. Of course data must be taken with caution, but I could not help noticing that when one switches from smartphone market share to mobile malware market share, the ranking positions are reversed: over 50% of mobile malware families detected by the security firm concern Symbian, approximately 15% are Java ME midlets, while the Android approximately suffers only of the 5% of the infections. Of course, as correctly stated on the article, this does not means that Symbian is the less secure. In my opinion the bigger percentage of mobile malware is a simple consequence of the fact that Symbian is still the Operating System with the greater spread. Of course malware writers deserve bigger attention to those platforms which offer the wider attack surface (that is the wider possibility to spread infections). And in this moment, Symbian is an attractive prey from this point of view. My sixth sense (and one half as we say in Italy) says that the Android will not take a long time in order to achieve also the unenviable first position also in the mobile malware market share, not only because it is spreading at an incredible speed, but also because it is becoming an enterprise platform (so the value of the data stored are much more attractive for Cyber Crooks.
As if on purpose, today Symantec discovered yet another malware for Android (Android.Walkinwat), which, at least for this time, tries to discipline users that download files illegally from unauthorized sites. Analogously to some of its noble malware predecessors (Geinimi, HongTouTou, Android.Pjapps), the malware is hidden inside a non-existent version of a true application (in this case Walk and Text) and downloaded from parallel markets from Asia and United States, but instead of stealing private data, simply floods of SMS the contacts.
Hey, just downloaded a pirated App off the Internet, Walk and Text for Android. I am stupid and cheap, it costed only 1 buck. Don’t steal like I did.
At the hand, after sending the SMS (affecting the user’s phone bill) it warns the user with the following message.
Unfortunately downloading malware from Asian parallel market is not new, and it is not a coincidence that the same report from Fortinet indicates that most mobile malware families are implemented by Russian or Chinese coders. This is undoubtely an increasing trend, and I am afraid that Chinese coders will soon shift their Cyber Espionage Operations to mobile devices…








