Archive
Finally I Saw One!
Update: F-Secure posted in their blog the complete description on how the patient 0 was found: And here it is the infamous “2011 recruitment plan message”.

Have a look to the fake sender: a message from beyond…
Original Post follows:
I am working hard for the August 2011 Cyber Attacks Timeline (stay tuned it is almost ready! Meanwhile you may check the previous ones) while I stumbled upon this very interesting article. Yes, I may say that finally I saw one of the Emails used for spear phishing attacks against RSA customers, using compromised seeds.
As you will probably know everything started on March 17, 2011, when RSA admitted to have been targeted by a sophisticated attack which led to certain information specifically related to RSA’s SecurID two-factor authentication products being subtracted from RSA’s systems.
Of course the sole seed and serial number of the token (the alleged information subtracted) is not enough to carry on a successful attack, so the attacker (whose possible target were presumably RSA customers) had to find a way to get the missing pieces of the puzzle, that is the username and the PIN. And which is the best way? Of course Spear Phishing!
And here the example of a fake spear phishing E-mail targeting one of the One of America’s Most Secret (and Important) Agencies and in the same Time RSA customers:

Likely the same attack vector was utilized against three Contractors (RSA Customers) which were targeted by attacks based on compromised SecurID seeds between April and May (Lockheed Martin, L-3, and Northrop Grumman). What a terrible year for Contractors and DHS related agencies!
By chance today F-Secure revealed to have discovered the patient zero, that is the mail (“2011 Recruitment Plan”) used to convey the APT inside RSA. Someone (who decided to follow the best practices for anomalous e-mails) submitted it to Virus Total, a cloud based service for scanning files, and it looks like that F-Secure antimalware analyst Timo Hirvonen discovered the e-mail message buried in the millions of submissions stored in this crowd-sourced database of malicious or potentially malicious files.
Original Source of Spear Phishing E-mail: http://www.cyveillanceblog.com, Kudos to @yo9fah for reporting me the link.
The Secret Behind LOIC? Simple!
Everyone dealing with Information Security knows very well that SNMP (which stands for Simple Network Management Protocol and corresponds to the standard UDP protocol used to monitor servers and network elements) is considered insecure. In too many circumstances network administrators forget to change the default community strings (the strings used to “softly” authenticate the manager and the agents) from their default values which are typically “public” for read-only access and “private” for read-and-write access on the monitored device. This happens sometimes for thoughtlessness, or simply because network administrators do not consider changing the default security strings a security issues.
And even if SNMP version 3 is used (which grants encryption and mutual authentication between the manager and the agents -at least the attackers may not spoof the default community strings-) in 12 years of honorable career I never found so far the right combination between manager and agent versions: I mean when you have a network manager supporting version 3, the agents only support version 1 or 2c and vice versa if the agents support version 3 you may be sure that the manager only supports version 1 or 2c.
Now there is a reason more to consider SNMP (and its default configurations) an hazard for Information Security. This reason is four letters long and is called LOIC, the infamous tool used by Anonymous to perpetrate the well known DDoS attacks.
So far the infosec community has been divided into two opposite factions: on one side those who think that Anonymous-perpetrated DDoS attacks are successful even with a small number of “enrolled cannons” since the same Anononymous owns a Botnet which from time to time is unleashed against the target. On the other side those claiming that this kind of attacks may be successful only if a huge number of participants volunteer accomplices is enrolled.
Today an article written by Alex Holden, Cyopsis Director of Enterprise Security, offers an alternative hypothesis. The attack method Holden describes is called a Reflected Denial of Service (RDoS) and just utilizes SNMP, which is UDP-based, exploiting the weaknesses in default configurations which populate many devices composing the Internet, with devastating consequences.
The SNMP paradigm, as the name suggests, is very simple: each device (server, network device or application) which must be monitored provides some status variables to the external world. The variables may be queried by a special application called network manager. The variables are organized in different groups (or leaves), and identified by OIDs (or Obiect IDentifiers). Querying the main OID (1.3.6.1) returns all the variables (this is an operation called snmpwalk).
If the assumption of Holden is correct, suppose you are able to spoof a manager with the same address than the target of the attack, and suppose to generate continuous SNMP queries with that address, querying the main OID from all the Internet devices which are known to have standard community strings. The unaware target will be flooded by SNMP replies from those devices with a lethal amplification effect and consequently an apparently innocent misconfiguration (that is the unchanged default community string) becomes an hazard for the Internet.
Of course this is a mere speculation (I did not verify source code), but this would explain why the Anonymous claimed that LOIC traffic is was hard to detect (but not always): the SNMP protocol is very popular and widespread on the Internet.
The same arrests of LOIC users are the reason why a new tool is in development called #RefRef. Developed with JavaScript, the tool is said to use the target site’s own processing power against itself, causing the target to succumbs to resource exhaustion: looks like a Reflected attack against itself).
(Original link via Infosecisland).
Looking Inside a Year of Android Malware
As you will probably know my Birthday post for Android Malware has deserved a mention from Engadget and Wired. Easily predictable but not for me, the Engadget link has been flooded by comments posted by Android supporters and adversaries, with possible trolls’ infiltrations, up to the point that the editorial staff has decided to disable comments from the article. The effect has been so surprising that someone has also insinuated, among other things, that I have been paid to talk s**t on the Android.
Now let me get some rest from this August Italian Sun and let me try to explain why I decided to celebrate this strange malware birthday for the Android.
First of all I want to make a thing clear: I currently do own an Android Device, and convinced, where possible, all my relatives and friends to jump on the Android. Moreover I do consider the Google platform an inseparable companion for my professional and personal life.
So what’s wrong? If you scroll the malware list you may easily notice that the malware always require an explicit consent from the user, so at first glance the real risk is the extreme trust that users put in their mobile devices which are not considered “simple” phones (even if smart), but real extensions of their personal and professional life.
You might say that this happens also for traditional devices (such as laptops), but in case of mobile devices there is a huge social and cultural difference: users are not aware to bring on their pocket dual (very soon four) cores mini-PCs and are not used to apply the same attention deserved for their old world traditional devices. Their small display size also make these devices particularly vulnerable to phishing (consider for instance the malware Android.GGTracker).
If we focus on technology instead of culture (not limiting the landscape to mobile) it easy to verify that the activity of developing malware (which nowadays is essentially a cybercrime activity) is a trade off between different factors affecting the potential target which include, at least its level of diffusion and its value for the attacker (in a mobile scenario the value corresponds to the value of the information stored on the device). The intrinsic security model of the target is, at least in my opinion, a secondary factor since the effort to overtake it, is simply commensurate with the value of the potential plunder.
What does this mean in simple words? It means that Android devices are growing exponentially in terms of market shares and are increasingly being used also for business. As a consequence there is a greater audience for the attackers, a greater value for the information stored (belonging to the owner’s personal and professional sphere) and consequently the sum of these factors is inevitably attracting Cybercrooks towards this platform.
Have a look to the chart drawing Google OS Market share in the U.S. (ComScore Data) compared with the number of malware samples in this last year (Data pertaining Market Share for June and July are currently not available):
So far the impact of the threats is low, but what makes the Google Platform so prone to malware? For sure not vulnerabilities: everything with a line of code is vulnerable, and, at least for the moment, a recent study from Symantec has found only 18 vulnerabilities for Google OS against 300 found for iOS (please do no question on the different age of the two OSes I only want to show that vulnerabilities are common and in this context Android is comparable with its main competitor).
Going back to the initial question there are at least three factors which make Android different:
- The application permission model relies too heavily on the user,
- The security policy for the market has proven to be weak,
- The platform too easily allows to install applications from untrusted sources with the sideloading feature.
As far as the first point is concerned: some commenters correctly noticed that apps do not install themselves on their own, but need, at least for the first installation, the explicit user consent. Well I wonder: how many “casual users” in your opinion regularly check permissions during application installation? And, even worse, as far as business users are concerned, the likely targets of cybercrime who consider the device as a mere work tool: do you really think that business users check app permission during installation? Of course a serious organization should avoid the associated risks with a firm device management policy before considering a wide deployment of similar devices, most of all among CxOs; but unfortunately we live in an imperfect world and too much often fashion and trends are faster (and stronger) than Security Policies and also make the device to be used principally for other things than its business primary role, hugely increasing risks.
This point is a serious security concern, as a matter of fact many security vendors (in my opinion the security industry is in delay in this context) offer Device Management Solution aimed to complete the native Application Access Control model. Besides it is not a coincidence that some rumors claim that Google is going to modify (enhance) the app permission security process.
As far as the second point is concerned (Android Market security policy), after the DroidDream affair, (and the following fake security update), it is clear that the Android Market Publishing (and Security) model needs to be modified, making it more similar to the App Store. There are several proposals in this context, of course in this place is not my intention to question on them but only to stress that the issue is real.
Last but not least Sideloading is something that makes Android very different from other platforms (read Apple), Apple devices do not allow to install untrusted apps unless you do not Jailbreak the devices. Android simply needs the user to flag an option (By The Way many vendors are opening their Android devices to root or alternate ROMs, consider for instance LG which in Italy does not invalidate the Warranty for rooted devices) or HTC which, on May 27, stated they will no longer have been locking the bootloaders on their devices.
So definitively the three above factors (together with the growing market shares) make Android more appealing for malware developers and this is not due to an intrinsic weakness of the platform rather than a security platform model which is mainly driven by the user and not locked by Manufacturer as it happens in case of Cupertino.
Related articles
- Looking Back at a Year of Android Malware (engadget.com)
- One Year Of Android Malware (Full List) (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
- One Year of Android Malware (wired.com)
MySpace Hacked? No It wasn’t!
Update: Next Web pointed out that that what has been reported is a standard error message used by MySpace since 2009. I know these are hard times of hoaxes and psychological terrorism driven by the recent hacks by Anonymous and LulzSec but I hope that the lesson will be learned. Probably it would be better, in times like these, to use clearer error messages. At any rate this is only the latest demonstration of what it means to be hacking in the time of Twitter: advertising an attack, too often before performing it, has become even more important than the effect of the attack itself.
Original Post
Even if the infamous OpFacebook announced a couple of days ago is probably a hoax, nevertheless it looks like other hackers did not waste time and hacked MySpace.
As usual the hack was announced with an (Anonymous) tweet:
Following the link (http://www.myspace.com/modules/common/static/html/error.html) leads to a bad surprise, a page whose title is meaningful “All is wrong
“. By the way www.myspace.com is currently unavailable.
We messed up our code so bad that even puppies and kittens may be in danger. Please turn back …now.
One Year Of Android Malware (Full List)
Update August 14: After the list (and the subsequent turmoil) here is the Look Inside a Year Of Android Malware.
So here it is the full list of Android Malware in a very dangerous year, since August, the 9th 2011 up-to-today.
My birthday gift for the Android is complete: exactly One year ago (9 August 2010) Kaspersky discovered the first SMS Trojan for Android in the Wild dubbed SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a. This is considered a special date for the Google Mobile OS, since, before then, Android Malware was a litte bit more than en exercise of Style, essentially focused on Spyware. After that everything changed, and mobile malware targeting the Android OS become more and more sophisticated.
Scroll down my special compilation showing the long malware trail which characterized this hard days for information security. Commenting the graph, in my opinion, probably the turning point was Android.Geinimi (end of 2010), featuring the characteristics of a primordial Botnet, but also Android.DroidDream (AKA RootCager) is worthwhile to mention because of its capability to root the phone and potentially to remotely install applications without direct user intervention.
As you will notice, the average impact is low, but, the number of malware is growing exponentially reaching a huge peak in July.
Let’s go in this mobile malware travel between botnets, sleepwalkers, biblic plagues and call Hijackers, and meanwhile do not forget to read my presentation on how to implement a secure mobile strategy.
| Date | Description | Features | Overall Risk |
| Aug 9 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a
First SMS Android Malware In the Wild: The malicious program penetrates Android devices in the guise of a harmless media player application. Once manually installed on the phone, the Trojan uses the system to begin sending SMSs to premium rate numbers without the owner’s knowledge or consent, resulting in money passing from a user’s account to that of the cybercriminals. |
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| Aug 17 2010 | AndroidOS_Droisnake.A
This is the first GPS Spy Malware disguised as an Android Snake game application. To the victim, Tap Snake looks like a clone of the Snake game. However, once someone installs this app on a phone, the “game” serves as a front for a spy app that proceeds to run in the background, secretly reporting GPS coordinates back to a server. The would-be spy then pays for and downloads an app called GPS Spy and enters an email address and code to gain access to the victim’s uploaded data. |
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| Sep 14 2010 | SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.b
Pornography lands on Android! This malware is a variant of SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. The malware poses as a pornographic application whose package name is pornoplayer.apk, and it installs on the phone with a pornographic icon. When the user launches the application, the malware does not show any adult content and, instead, sends 4 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Oct 13 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.c
Pornography back on Android! Third variant of the malware SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. New pornographic application, old icon. Sends 2 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Dec 29 2010 |
Android.Geinimi
First example of a Botnet-Like Malware on Android. “Grafted” onto repackaged versions of legitimate applications, primarily games, and distributed in third-party Chinese Android app markets. Once the malware is installed on a user’s phone, it has the potential to receive commands from a remote server that allow the owner of that server to control the phone. The specific information it collects includes location coordinates and unique identifiers for the device (IMEI) and SIM card (IMSI). |
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| Feb 14 2011 |
Android.Adrd AKA Android.HongTouTou
New Malware with Botnet-like Features from China. The trojan compromises personal data such as IMEI/IMSI of the device and sends them back to the remote side to react based on the commands from there. Similar to Android.Geinimi but with a lower profile (less commands) |
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| Feb 22 2011 | Android.Pjapps
New Trojan horse embedded on third party applications. It opens a back door on the compromised device and retrieves commands from a remote command and control server. |
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| Mar 1 2011 | Android.DroidDream AKA Android.Rootcager AKA AndroidOS_Lootoor.A The first example of a new generation of Mobile Malware: distributed through the Official Android Market, affected, according to Symantec 50,000 to 200,000 users. Expoits two different tools (rageagainstthecage and exploid) to root the phone |
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| Mar 9 2011 | Android.BgServ AKA Troj/Bgserv-A AKA AndroidOS_BGSERV.A Trojanized version of the Android Market Security tool released by Google, on March the 6th, to remove the effects of DroidDream. The trojan opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location. It shows more than ever security and reputation flaws in the Android Market Proposition Model. 5,000 users affected. |
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| Mar 20 2011 | Android.Zeahache Trojan horse that elevates privileges on the compromised device, discovered on a Chinese language app available for download on alternative Chinese app markets. The app has the ability to root an Android device (by mean of the exploid tool called by zHash binary), leaving the device vulnerable to future threats. The app, which provides calling plan management capabilities was found also on the Android Market albeit this version lacked the code to invoke the exploit. |
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| Mar 30 2011 | Android.Walkinwat
Manually installed from non-official Android Markets, the Trojan modifies certain permissions on the compromised device that allow it to perform the following actions: Access contacts in the address book, ccess network information, access the phone in a read-only state, access the vibrator on the phone, Check the license server for the application, find the phone’s location, initiate a phone call without using the interface, open network sockets to access the Internet, read low-level log files, send SMS messages, turn the phone on and off. It gives a message to user trying to discipline users that download files illegally from unauthorized sites. |
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| May 9 2011 |
Android.Adsms AKA AndroidOS_Adsms.A This malware specifically targeted China Mobile subscribers. The malware arrived through a link sent through SMS. The said message tells the China Mobile users to install a patch for their supposedly vulnerable devices by accessing the given link, which actually leads to a malicious configuration file. The malware then send message to premium numbers. |
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| May 11 2011 |
Android.Zsone AKA Android.Smstibook Google removed a Trojan, Zsone, from the Android Market with the ability to subscribe users in China to premium rate QQ codes via SMS without their knowledge. 10,000 users affected. |
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| May 22 2011 |
A biblical plague For Android! Trojanized version of a legitimate application that is part threat, part doomsayer. The threat was embedded in a pirated version of an app called ‘Holy ***king Bible’, which itself has stirred controversy on multiple forums in which the app is in circulation. The malware targeted North American Users. After the reboot, it starts a service whichm at regular intervals, attempts to contact a host service, passing along the device’s phone number and operator code. It then attempts to retrieve a command from a remote location in intervals of 33 minutes. In addition to having abilities to respond to commands through the Internet and SMS, the threat also has activities that are designed to trigger on the 21 and 22 of May 2011, respectively (The End of The World). |
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| May 31 2011 |
A brand new version of Android.DroidDream, dubbed DroidDreamLight, was found in 24 additional apps repackaged and redistributed with the malicious payload across a total of 5 different developers distributed in the Android Market. Between 30.000 and 120.000 users affected. |
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| Jun 6 2011 |
Android/DroidKungFu.A AKA Android.Gunfu Malware which uses the same exploit than DroidDream, rageagainstthecage, to gain root privilege and install the main malware component. Once installed, the malware has backdoor capabilities and is able to: execute command to delete a supplied file, execute a command to open a supplied homepage, download and install a supplied APK, open a supplied URL, run or start a supplied application package. The malware is moreover capable to obtain some information concerning the device and send them to a remote server: The collected information include: IMEI number, Build version release, SDK version, users’ mobile number, Phone model, Network Operator, Type of Net Connectivity, SD card available memory, Phone available memory. In few words, the device is turned into a member of a botnet. |
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| Jun 9 2011 |
Trojan Horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. When an infected application is installed, it attempts to exploit the udev Netlink Message Validation Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (BID 34536) in order to obtain “root” privileges. Once running with “root” privileges it installs an executable which contains functionality to communicate with a control server using HTTP protocol and sends information such as Subscriber ID, Manufacturer and Model of the device, Version of the Android operating system. The Trojan also periodically connects to the control server and may perform the following actions: send SMS messages, remove SMS messages from the Inbox and dial phone numbers. The Trojan also contains functionality to monitor phone usage. |
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| Jun 9 2011 |
Android.Uxipp AKA Android/YZHCSMS.A Trojan Horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers. Again the threat is as an application for a Chinese gaming community. When executed, the Trojan attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to several numbers and remove the SMS sent. |
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| Jun 10 2011 |
Andr/Plankton-A AKA Android.Tonclank This is a Trojan horse which steals information and may open a back door on Android devices. Available for download in the Android Market embedded in several applications, when the Trojan is executed, it steals the following information from the device: Device ID and Device permissions. The above information is then sent to a remote server from which the Trojan downloads a .jar file which opens a back door and accepts commands to perform the following actions on the compromised device: copies all of the bookmarks on the device, copies all of the history on the device, copies all of the shortcuts on the device, creates a log of all of the activities performed on the device, modifies the browser’s home page, returns the status of the last executed command. The gathered information is then sent to a remote location. |
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| Jun 15 2011 |
Trojan found in alternative Android markets that predominately target Chinese Android users. This Trojan predominantly affects devices with a custom ROM. The application masquerades as a legitimate one and exploits a vulnerability found in the way most custom ROMs sign their system images to install a secondary payload (without user permission) onto the ROM, giving it the ability to communicate with a remote server and receive commands. Once installed the second payload may read, send and process incoming SMS messages (potentially for mTAN interception or fraudulent premium billing subscriptions), install apps trasparently, communicate with a remote server using DES encryption. |
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| Jun 20 2011 |
This trojan is automatically downloaded to a user’s phone after visiting a malicious webpage that imitates the Android Market. The Trojan, which targets users in the United States by interacting with a number of premium SMS subscription services without consent, is able to sign-up a victim to a number of premium SMS subscription services without the user’s consent. This can lead to unapproved charges to a victim’s phone bill. Android users are directed to install this Trojan after clicking on a malicious in-app advertisement, for instance a Fake Battery Saver. |
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| Jul 1 2011 |
Repackaged and distributed in the form of “legitimate” applications, these two variants are different from the original one by re-implementing some of their malicious functionalities in native code and supporting two additional command and control (C&C) domains. The changes are possibly in place to make their detection and analysis harder. The repackaged apps infected with the DroidKungFu variants are made available through a number of alternative app markets and forums targeting Chinese-speaking users. |
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| Jul 3 2011 | AndroidOS_Crusewin.A AKA Android.Crusewind
Another example of a trojan which sends SMS to premium rate numbers. It also acts as a SMS Relay. It displays a standard Flash icon in the application list. The Trojan attempts to download an XML configuration file and uses it to retrieve a list of further URLs to send and receive additional data. The Trojan also contains functionality to perform the following actions: delete itself, delete SMS messages, send premium-rate SMS messages to the number that is specified in the downloaded XML configuration file, update itself. |
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| Jul 6 2011 |
AndroidOS_SpyGold.A AKA Android.GoldDream This backdoor is a Trojanized copy of a legitimate gaming application for Android OS smartphones. It steals sensitive information of the affected phone’s SMS and calls functions, compromising the security of the device and of the user. It monitors the affected phone’s SMS and phone calls and sends stolen information to a remote URL. It also connects to a malicious URL in order to receive commands from a remote malicious user. |
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| Jul 8 2011 | DroidDream Light Variant New variant of DroidDream Light in the Android Market, immediately removed by Google. Number of downloads was limited to 1000 – 5000. This is the third iteration of malware likely created by the authors of DroidDream. |
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| Jul 11 2011 |
Android.Smssniffer AKA Andr/SMSRep-B/C AKA Android.Trojan.SmsSpy.B/C AKA Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Smser.a
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| Jul 12 2011 |
Android.HippoSMS AKA Android.Hippo Another threat found bundled with repackaged versions of legitimate applications. When the Trojan is executed, it grabs a copy of all SMS messages received on the handheld device and sends them to a remote location. |
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| Jul 15 2011 |
This threat is often found bundled with repackaged versions of legitimate applications. The repackaged applications are typically found on unofficial websites offering Android applications. When the Trojan is executed, it steals information and sends it to a remote server. |
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| Jul 15 2011 |
Android/Sndapps.A AKA Android.Snadapps Five Android Apps found in the official Android Market share a common suspicious payload which upload users’ personal information such as email accounts as well as phone numbers to a remote server without user’s awareness. |
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| Jul 27 2011 |
Trojan horse which steals several information from Android devices (for instance GPS Location or Wi-Fi position). For the first time on the Android Platform a malware is believed to spy conversations. |
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| Jul 28 2011 |
Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone number. When the Trojan is executed, it retrieves information containing premium-rate phone numbers from a malicious URL then sends premium-rate SMS messages. and attempts to block any confirmation SMS messages the compromised device may receive from the premium-rate number in an attempt to mask its activities. The Trojan also attempts to gather IMSI and location information and send the information to the remote attacker. |
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| Aug2 2011 |
This is a detection for Trojan horses that send SMS texts to premium-rate numbers. These Trojan is a repackaged versions of genuine Android software packages, often distributed outside the Android Marketplace. The package name, publisher, and other details will vary and may be taken directly from the original application.. |
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| Aug 9 2011 |
It belongs to the same NickiSpy family. However, it is significantly different from its predecessor since it is fully controlled by SMS messages instead of relying on a hard-coded C&C server for instructions. In addition, NickiBot supports a range of bot commands, such as for (GPS-based) location monitoring, sound recording and (email-based) uploading, calllog collection, etc. It also has a check-in mechanism to a remote website. his threat is often found bundled with repackaged versions of legitimate applications. The repackaged applications are typically found on unofficial websites offering Android applications. When the Trojan is executed, it steals information and sends it to a remote server. |
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Legend
Parallel Market
Android Market
Manual Install
Automatic Install of Apps
Send SMS or Calls to Premium Numbers
Server C&C
GPS Spyware
Root Access
Related articles
- Happy Birthday! One Year of Android Malware (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
- Nine Months Of Living Dangerously (paulsparrows.wordpress.com)
Riot In Motion
As an (in)direct consequence of the London Riots, a crew of hackers called TeaMp0isoN has defaced the The Official BlackBerry Blog after RIM has indicated to assist London police, who are investigating the use of the messaging service in organizing riots, with a “very extensive monitoring of the BlackBerry Messenger model”.
The availability of BBM (Black Berry Messenger), a closed messaging system for one-to-one or one-to-many (encrypted!) communications at no charge, has made BlackBerry a very popular device among U.K. teens, who are believed to be the major responsible for the riots which have hit British streets. As a consequence BlackBerry Messenger is believed to have played a key role for rioters to organize themselves.
Since the Company decided to support the Police to contain the riot, granting access to BBM data and logs, it did not take so long for a resounding retaliation by the above quoted hacker group.
Curiously shortly after the attack, MP called for BlackBerry Messenger suspension to calm UK riots, and albeit this is claimed as a victory from rioters, I cannot help but notice that it is really a paradox: the whole story is a consequence of the need for authorities to extensively monitor BBM and the same authorities now ask for a complete lockdown of BBM which might be the ultimate remediation to stop the riots).
In my opinion, this hactivism event can be seen from a double perspective: at first glance this is only the last episode of hactivism, whose actions and impacts are nowadays natural extensions in the fifth virtual domain for wars and revolutions crossing the borders of the real world. But a second deeper analysis shows surprising and, somewhat, unexpected consequences.
The event was a consequence of the attempt by authorities to deprive rioters of their weapons, that is mobile technologies. Said in simple words, we are seeing a kind of Consumerization of Riots (the western world equivalent of what I defined Consumerization of Warfare that is the influence played by consumer technologies, mobile and social networks in primis, for spreading the riots in Middle East). Of course with the obvious difference of scopes and geography.
But if the contemporary use of both mobile technologies, for communicating and coordinating, and Social Media for virally spreading information useful for the cause (tweets like weapons), is a (quite) common and consolidated practice whose primary role has been recognized for the revolutions of Maghreb and Middle East, what is completely new is, for the first time, the impact and the price (to be) paid by the technology vendor, in this case RIM, (in)directly involved in the events. As a matter of fact RIM is suffering heavy aftermaths, which will not likely end here.
Not only the Waterloo based company was hacked with a resounding defacement, with huge consequences in terms of image, but also the brand seriously risks to be negatively associated with rioters, which could lead to further negative impacts for the brand, with possible consequences in terms of sells.
Is this maybe the reason why Twitter refused to shut down the accounts of the London rioters, besides the blog post according to which Tweets must always flow?
P.S. From an Information Security Perspective…
Several Information Security blogs were wondering if hackers managed to post on BlackBerry’s blog because of a software vulnerability, or because one of their administrators had his password cracked. In my opinion several tweets from TeaMp0isoN seems to confirm the first hypothesis:
Happy Birthday! One Year of Android Malware
Exactly One year ago (9 August 2010) Kaspersky discovered the first SMS Trojan for Android in the Wild dubbed SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a. This is considered a special date for the Google Mobile OS, since, before then, Android Malware was a litte bit more than en exercise of Style, essentially focused on Spyware. After that everything changed, and mobile malware targeting the Android OS become more and more sophisticated.
For this reason I decided to prepare a special birthday gift for the Android, that is a special compilation showing the long malware trail which characterized this day. Commenting the graph, in my opinion, probably the turning point was Android.Geinimi (end of 2010), featuring the characteristics of a primordial Botnet, but also Android.DroidDream (AKA RootCager) is worthwhile to mention because of its capability to root the phone and potentially to remotely install applications without direct user intervention. Moreover, as you will have probably noticed, the average impact is low, but, the number of malware is growing exponentially after June, this is the reason why I decided to divide my special compilation in two parts. Today is part I: from the beginning to May, the 31st 2011.
Let’s go in this mobile malware travel between botnets, sleepwalkers and biblic plagues and meanwhile do not forget to read my presentation on how to implement a secure mobile strategy.
| Date | Description | Features | Overall Risk |
| Aug 9 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a
First SMS Android Malware In the Wild: The malicious program penetrates Android devices in the guise of a harmless media player application. Once manually installed on the phone, the Trojan uses the system to begin sending SMSs to premium rate numbers without the owner’s knowledge or consent, resulting in money passing from a user’s account to that of the cybercriminals. |
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| Aug 17 2010 | AndroidOS_Droisnake.A
This is the first GPS Spy Malware disguised as an Android Snake game application. To the victim, Tap Snake looks like a clone of the Snake game. However, once someone installs this app on a phone, the “game” serves as a front for a spy app that proceeds to run in the background, secretly reporting GPS coordinates back to a server. The would-be spy then pays for and downloads an app called GPS Spy and enters an email address and code to gain access to the victim’s uploaded data. |
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| Sep 14 2010 | SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.b
Pornography lands on Android! This malware is a variant of SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. The malware poses as a pornographic application whose package name is pornoplayer.apk, and it installs on the phone with a pornographic icon. When the user launches the application, the malware does not show any adult content and, instead, sends 4 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Oct 13 2010 |
SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.c
Pornography back on Android! Third variant of the malware SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.A. New pornographic application, old icon. Sends 2 SMS messages to short codes, at the end-user’s expense. |
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| Dec 29 2010 |
Android.Geinimi
First example of a Botnet-Like Malware on Android. “Grafted” onto repackaged versions of legitimate applications, primarily games, and distributed in third-party Chinese Android app markets. Once the malware is installed on a user’s phone, it has the potential to receive commands from a remote server that allow the owner of that server to control the phone. The specific information it collects includes location coordinates and unique identifiers for the device (IMEI) and SIM card (IMSI). |
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| Feb 14 2011 |
Android.Adrd AKA Android.HongTouTou
New Malware with Botnet-like Features from China. The trojan compromises personal data such as IMEI/IMSI of the device and sends them back to the remote side to react based on the commands from there. Similar to Android.Geinimi but with a lower profile (less commands) |
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| Feb 22 2011 | Android.Pjapps
New Trojan horse embedded on third party applications. It opens a back door on the compromised device and retrieves commands from a remote command and control server. |
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| Mar 1 2011 | Android.DroidDream AKA Android.Rootcager AKA AndroidOS_Lootoor.A The first example of a new generation of Mobile Malware: distributed through the Official Android Market, affected, according to Symantec 50,000 to 200,000 users. Expoits two different tools (rageagainstthecage and exploid) to root the phone |
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| Mar 9 2011 | Android.BgServ AKA Troj/Bgserv-A AKA AndroidOS_BGSERV.A Trojanized version of the Android Market Security tool released by Google, on March the 6th, to remove the effects of DroidDream. The trojan opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location. It shows more than ever security and reputation flaws in the Android Market Proposition Model. 5,000 users affected. |
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| Mar 20 2011 | Android.Zeahache Trojan horse that elevates privileges on the compromised device, discovered on a Chinese language app available for download on alternative Chinese app markets. The app has the ability to root an Android device (by mean of the exploid tool called by zHash binary), leaving the device vulnerable to future threats. The app, which provides calling plan management capabilities was found also on the Android Market albeit this version lacked the code to invoke the exploit. |
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| Mar 30 2011 | Android.Walkinwat
Manually installed from non-official Android Markets, the Trojan modifies certain permissions on the compromised device that allow it to perform the following actions: Access contacts in the address book, ccess network information, access the phone in a read-only state, access the vibrator on the phone, Check the license server for the application, find the phone’s location, initiate a phone call without using the interface, open network sockets to access the Internet, read low-level log files, send SMS messages, turn the phone on and off. It gives a message to user trying to discipline users that download files illegally from unauthorized sites. |
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| May 9 2011 |
Android.Adsms AKA AndroidOS_Adsms.A This malware specifically targeted China Mobile subscribers. The malware arrived through a link sent through SMS. The said message tells the China Mobile users to install a patch for their supposedly vulnerable devices by accessing the given link, which actually leads to a malicious configuration file. The malware then send message to premium numbers. |
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| May 11 2011 |
Android.Zsone AKA Android.Smstibook Google removed a Trojan, Zsone, from the Android Market with the ability to subscribe users in China to premium rate QQ codes via SMS without their knowledge. 10,000 users affected. |
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| May 22 2011 |
A biblical plague For Android! Trojanized version of a legitimate application that is part threat, part doomsayer. The threat was embedded in a pirated version of an app called ‘Holy ***king Bible’, which itself has stirred controversy on multiple forums in which the app is in circulation. The malware targeted North American Users. After the reboot, it starts a service whichm at regular intervals, attempts to contact a host service, passing along the device’s phone number and operator code. It then attempts to retrieve a command from a remote location in intervals of 33 minutes. In addition to having abilities to respond to commands through the Internet and SMS, the threat also has activities that are designed to trigger on the 21 and 22 of May 2011, respectively (The End of The World). |
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| May 31 2011 |
A brand new version of Android.DroidDream, dubbed DroidDreamLight, was found in 24 additional apps repackaged and redistributed with the malicious payload across a total of 5 different developers distributed in the Android Market. Between 30.000 and 120.000 users affected. |
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Legend
Parallel Market
Android Market
Manual Install
Automatic Install of Apps
Send SMS or Calls to Premium Numbers
Server C&C
GPS Spyware
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